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Executive	Summary 
	
	
From	political	to	commercial	applications,	the	growth	of	online	targeting—the	customisation	of 
products	and	services	online	(including	content,	service	standards	and	prices)	based	on	data 
about	individuals	and	groups—has	profound	implications.	It	inﬂuences	how	we	live,	how	we 
connect,	what	we	know	and	what	we	consume.  
Online	targeting	gives	companies,	governments	and	other	organisations	the	ability	to	create 
customised	services	with	the	potential	to	bring	signiﬁcant	beneﬁts	to	citizens	and	consumers.	Yet 
these	same	data-driven	relationships,	in	which	organisations	hold	unprecedented	amounts	of 
information	about	people,	raise	fears	of	manipulation	and	concerns	over	privacy	and 
accountability.	As	the	Yale	Professor	Paul	M.	Schwartz	puts	it,	“the	danger	that	the	computer 
poses	is	to	human	autonomy.	The	more	that	is	known	about	someone,	the	easier	[they	are]	to 
control.”  1
This	Landscape	Summary	contributes	to	the	growing	debate	about	online	targeting	by	surveying 
what	is	currently	known	across	academic,	policy	and	other	literature	related	to	online	targeting. 
Drawing	on	this	growing	evidence	base,	this	Landscape	Summary	draws	together	what	the 
literature	has	to	say	about	how	online	targeting	works,	how	people	feel	about	it,	its	potential	harms 
and	beneﬁts,	and	current	and	future	oversight	mechanisms.	Key	ﬁndings	include: 
● An	expanding	range	of	data	is	being	used	for	targeting	purposes.		Modern	practices	are 
evolving	to	encompass	a	wide	variety	of	data	sources,	ranging	from	relatively	established 
forms	of	demographic	and	behavioural	information	to	newer	sub-categories	of 
psychographic,	geospatial,	sentiment,	biometric	and	transactional	data.	This	data	is	being 
collected,	analysed,	used	and	traded	by	data	brokers	and	end	users	for	many	different 
purposes,	including	commercial	and	political	advertising	and	the	curation	of	personalised 
media	and	services. 
● Most	people	are	uncomfortable	with	current	online	targeting	practices,	though	attitudes 
vary	substantially	across	different	age	groups,	and	as	levels	of	understanding	change.	A 
number	of	surveys	have	shown	that	a	majority	of	people	dislike	current	online	targeting 
approaches,	and	this	dislike	increases	as	they	learn	more	about	them.	However,	young 
people	in	general	appear	to	be	both	more	aware,	and	more	comfortable,	with	targeting 
practices	than	older	age	groups. 
● There	are	a	wide	range	of	possible	harms	and	beneﬁts	experienced	by	individuals, 
organisations	and	society.	Among	these,	the	harms	to	individuals,	which	include	a	loss	of 
privacy	and	risks	of	manipulation	and	exploitation,	and	the	beneﬁts	to	companies,	which 
include	an	improved	ability	to	reach	and	inﬂuence	customers,	are	better	understood. 
However,	we	have	a	more	limited	understanding	of	the	types	or	extent	of	harms	and 
1		Zuboﬀ,	S.	(2019).		The	age	of	surveillance	capitalism:	The	ﬁght	for	a	human	future	at	the	new	fron er	of	power		(p.	
191).	Proﬁle	Books.	
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beneﬁts	which	affect	society	more	widely,	such	as	the	potential	longer-term	political 
consequences	and	impacts	on	social	cohesion	of	online	targeting. 
This	Landscape	Summary	also	identiﬁes	a	range	of	gaps	where	research	has	yet	to	emerge.	Where 
possible,	we	suggest	questions	and	themes	which	might	help	inform	future	policy	decisions.	Some 
of	the	unanswered	questions	we	have	identiﬁed	include: 
● How	are	speciﬁc	targeting	techniques	evolving	in	practice?		There	are	gaps	in	knowledge 
around	the	speciﬁc	ways	in	which	institutions,	organisations	and	corporations	use	targeting 
tools	and	techniques.	Greater	openness	from	organisations	developing	and	using	targeting 
tools	would	support	this	research. 
● How	do	attitudes	to	online	targeting	vary	across	different	groups,	and	how	do	they	change 
over	time?	We	have	limited	knowledge	and	understanding	of	how	attitudes	to	online 
targeting	vary	across	a	range	of	demographic	and	social	groups.	The	novelty	of	this	ﬁeld 
also	means	we	do	not	fully	understand	how	perceptions	and	attitudes	to	online	targeting 
are	changing.	There	is	also	relatively	little	research	on	how	the	context	in	which	online 
targeting	is	deployed	(whether	that	be	political,	commercial	or	societal)	changes	how 
people	perceive	these	practices. 
● What	impact	is	online	targeting	having	on	children	and	other	vulnerable	groups?	More 
research	is	needed	into	the	impact	of	online	targeting	on	children	and	other	vulnerable 
groups,	who	could	be	particularly	susceptible	to	these	approaches. 
● What	are	the	best	policy	responses	to	these	challenges,	and	what	role	is	there	for 
alternative	forms	of	governance	in	managing	online	targeting?		Greater	societal 
oversight—including	through	legislation	and	regulation—could	represent	good	options	to 
manage	some	of	the	harms	posed	by	targeting,	to	be	considered	alongside	ethical 
frameworks,	technological	solutions	and	awareness	raising	programmes.	There	is	also	little 
detailed	research	that	explores	the	potential	beneﬁts	of	online	targeting	for	individuals	or 
for	society	more	broadly,	and	how	these	might	be	further	developed	by	policy	and 
governance	measures. 
Ultimately,	there	are	a	range	of	competing	values	surrounding	the	use	of	online	targeting	which 
need	to	be	considered	as	debates	around	online	targeting	practices	continue	to	develop.	For 
example,	while	companies	want	to	increase	their	reach	and	inﬂuence	customers	more	effectively, 
there	is	a	need	to	protect	individuals	from	manipulation,	exploitation	and	unwarranted	invasions	of 
their	privacy.	There	is	also	the	need	to	protect	established	norms	of	media	plurality	and 
competition,	while	at	the	same	time	not	stiﬂing	the	new	and	innovative	forms	of	media	which	are 
currently	reliant	on	online	targeting.  
Determining	the	correct	balance	between	these	competing	claims	will	not	be	quick	or	simple,	but 
this	Landscape	Summary	aims	to	support	this	process	by	summarising	the	relevant	knowledge 
acquired	so	far,	highlighting	potential	solutions	where	they	exist	and	identifying	some	of	the 
questions	which	will	need	to	be	answered	if	online	targeting	as	a	practice	can	be	made	to	work	for 
the	good	of	everyone. 
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Background 
	
The	Centre	for	Data	Ethics	and	Innovation	(CDEI)	is	an	advisory	body	set	up	by	the	UK	Government 
and	led	by	an	independent	board	of	experts.	It	is	tasked	with	identifying	the	measures	we	need	to 
take	to	maximise	the	beneﬁts	of	data-driven	technologies	for	our	society	and	economy. 	The	CDEI 2
has	a	unique	mandate	to	advise	government	on	these	issues,	drawing	on	expertise	and 
perspectives	from	across	society. 
In	early	2019,	as	part	of	their	Review	of	Online	Targeting, 	the	CDEI	commissioned	the	Cabinet 3
Oﬃce	Open	Innovation	Team	to	engage	a	team	of	academics	led	by	Professor	David	Beer	of	the 
University	of	York	to	conduct	an	assessment	of	the	current	academic,	policy	and	other	literature	on 
the	subject,	and	identify	lessons	and	areas	where	more	research	is	needed.	We	would	like	to	thank 
Professor	Beer,	Dr	Joanna	Redden,	Cardiff	University,	Dr	Ben	Williamson,	Edinburgh	University	and 
Dr	Simon	Yuill,	Goldsmiths	University,	for	their	work	in	writing	this	Landscape	Summary.	We	would 
also	like	to	thank	Dr	Jennifer	Cobbe,	Cambridge	University,	Dr	Christopher	Burr,	Oxford	Internet 
Institute,	Dr	Michael	Veale,	Alan	Turing	Institute,	and	Professor	Andrew	McStay,	Bangor	University, 
for	their	work	in	reviewing	a	draft	of	the	Landscape	Summary	and	contributing	their	expertise	to 
the	ﬁnal	publication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2	CDEI	(2019).	The	Centre	for	Data	Ethics	and	Innova on	(CDEI)	2	Year	Strategy.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.gov.uk/government/publica ons/the-centre-for-data-ethics-and-innova on-cdei-2-year-strategy/centre-
for-data-ethics-cdei-2-year-strategy	[accessed	on	08/07/19].	
3	CDEI	(2019).	The	Centre	for	Data	Ethics	and	Innova on	(CDEI)	2019/20	Work	Programme.	Available	at:	
h	 ps://www.gov.uk/government/publica ons/the-centre-for-data-ethics-and-innova on-cdei-2019-20-work-program
me	[accessed	on	08/07/19].	
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1. Introduction 
 
 
What	is	often	described	as	online	or	digital	targeting	can	be	deﬁned	as	the	customisation	of 
products	and	services	online	(including	content,	service	standards	and	prices)	based	on	data 
about	individuals	and	groups,	and	the	predicted	likelihood	of	optimising	a	determined	outcome 
through	this	customisation.	It	means	that	each	individual	experiences	a	different	online 
environment,	one	that	has	been	personalised	and	tailored	according	to	a	speciﬁc	business	logic.  
 
But	why	is	this	the	subject	of	so	much	interest	and	scrutiny?  
 
One	of	the	most	controversial	and	compelling	features	of	online	targeting	is	its	purported	ability	to 
inﬂuence	and	shape	human	behaviour.	Whether	it	is	the	delivery	of	a	targeted	advert	or	political 
message	during	a	campaign,	the	potential	power	of	online	targeting	is	its	ability	to	deliver	highly 
contextual,	highly	customised	experiences,	to	persuade	someone	of	a	course	of	action.  
 
This	power	to	persuade	explains	another	salient	feature	of	online	targeting—its	ubiquity.	Targeting 
techniques	have	become	the	bedrock	of	today’s	internet	economy	and	are	deployed	widely	by 
major	commercial	organisations.	For	example,	in	online	advertising	alone,	it	has	been	estimated 
that	as	much	as	79%	of	digital	advertising	is	delivered	by	software	that	targets	users. 		And	as	we 4
shall	explore	in	this	review	of	the	literature,	targeting	is	also	being	used	in	political	campaigns	and 
other	arenas	of	public	discourse. 
As	well	as	its	ubiquity	and	potential	power	to	persuade,	online	targeting	is	contributing	to	the 
development	of	a	new	media	environment,	one	which	interacts	more	directly	with	each	individual. 
As	a	result,	content,	experiences	and	prices	are	highly	variable	and	dependent	upon	how	each 
individual	is	understood	as	a	consumer.	This	new	environment	can	be	thought	of	as	a	continually 
shifting	canvas,	constantly	optimising	and	adapting	as	it	interacts	with	users. 
Given	the	potential	for	online	targeting	to	inﬂuence	and	persuade	it	is	likely	to	have	substantial 
implications	for	our	psychological,	social	and	political	systems.	It	is	important,	therefore,	to 
establish	what	the	academic	literature	tells	us	about	targeting	and	how	we	might	respond	to	it.  
In	exploring	the	implications	of	online	targeting,	this	report	seeks	to	address	four	questions: 
1. How	does	online	targeting	work?  
2. What	do	we	know	about	how	individuals	understand	and	feel	about	online	targeting? 
3. What	are	the	harms	and	beneﬁts	of	targeting	and	the	infrastructures	which	facilitate	it	for 
individuals,	corporations	and	society,	and	what	are	the	trade-offs	involved?  
4. What	solutions,	if	any,	are	suggested	in	the	literature	and	how	might	harms	be	minimised 
and	beneﬁts	facilitated	over	the	short	and	longer	terms? 
 
4		Miller,	C.,	Coldicu ,	R.,	&	Kitcher,	H.	(2018).	People,	Power	and	Technology:	The	2018	Digital	Understanding	Report.	
Doteveryone	,	available	at:		h ps://understanding.doteveryone.org.uk	[accessed	on:	11/07/19].	
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These	four	questions	were	identiﬁed	by	a	group	of	academics	and	other	stakeholders,	as	the	most 
important	themes	emerging	within	the	ﬁeld	of	online	targeting. 	They	are	intended	to	give	the 5
report	a	series	of	focal	points,	in	what	is	a	complex	and	rapidly	evolving	ﬁeld.	As	well	as	giving	the 
report	focus,	these	questions	also	create	limits	in	the	coverage	and	scope	of	the	report.	There	will 
certainly	be	additional	questions	that	will	need	to	be	addressed	as	knowledge	of	online	targeting 
continues	to	grow.  
Each	question	is	addressed	through	a	review	of	the	most	relevant	research,	publications,	survey 
results	and	reports.	We	aim	to	draw	together	key	insights	and	interventions	in	the	ﬁeld,	but	it	is 
likely	that	it	does	not	cover	all	relevant	research.	We	remain	open	to	additional	research	papers	and 
further	evidence	being	submitted	as	part	of	the	ongoing	review	of	the	ﬁeld.	This	review	should	be 
seen	as	a	snapshot	of	the	current	literature,	which	is	likely	to	develop	and	evolve	as	new	insights 
emerge. 
  
 
 
 
   
5	A	Data	Ethics	Workshop	was	held	on	11	February	2019	to	determine	the	scope	of	this	review.	It	included	a endees	
from	the	University	of	York,	Oxford	Internet	Ins tute,	Edinburgh	University	and	Cambridge	University.	
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2. How	does	online	targeting	work? 
	
	
Chapter	summary 
● Data	is	collected	about	individuals,	and	subsequently	used	to	target	them,	in	many 
different	ways;	three	of	the	main	data	types	are	demographic,	behavioral	and 
psychographic,	though	other	approaches	are	also	being	used: 
o Demographic	data	includes	age,	gender	and	location. 
o Behavioural	data	includes	the	tracking	of	online	behaviours	such	as	what	sites 
people	visit,	what	search	terms	they	enter	and	their	app	activity. 
o Psychographic	data	is	designed	to	represent	attitudes	and	lifestyle,	and 
increasingly	allows	the	tracking	of	psychological	traits	and	sentiments. 
● Much	of	this	data	is	shared,	traded	and	collated,	by	data	brokers	and	end	users,	to	target 
us.	Increasingly,	microtargeting	techniques,	facilitated	by	the	growth	of	social	media	and 
the	use	of	unique	identiﬁers	and	online	ﬁngerprinting,	is	being	used	to	target	smaller 
segments	or	groups	of	users,	and	can	even	be	used	to	target	speciﬁc	individuals. 
● The	platforms	through	which	individuals	are	being	targeted,	and	the	purposes	of	the 
targeting,	vary	widely—this	can	be	online	services	such	as	Netﬂix	and	Spotify,	which	seek 
to	inﬂuence	our	entertainment	tastes,	online	retail	sites	such	as	Amazon	which	seek	to 
inﬂuence	our	purchasing	choices,	and	increasingly	political	campaigns,	which	may	seek 
to	inﬂuence	our	political	choices	surreptitiously	through	‘dark	ads’. 
● There	are	gaps	in	knowledge	around	the	speciﬁc	ways	in	which	institutions, 
organisations	and	corporations	deploy	these	targeting	practices. 
Overview 
Before	delving	into	speciﬁc	types	of	targeting,	it	is	worth	explaining	some	common	characteristics 
between	them.  
Targeting	is	based	on	feedback	loops	of	data 
As	a	result	of	the	widespread	use	of	the	internet,	including	social	media,	and	the	embeddedness	of 
third	party	tracking	technologies	in	webpages	and	apps, 	vast	swathes	of	data	have	been 6
accumulated	about	individuals	online.	This	data	is	now	increasingly	used	by	a	wide	variety	of 
organisations,	including	internet	platforms,	e-commerce	sites	and	ad-tech	companies	to	customise 
online	experiences.	This	creates	feedback	loops,	in	which	the	data	produced	by	individuals	from 
their	reaction	to	this	experience,	informs	the	creation	of	future	content	and	experiences	targeted	at 
6		Binns,	R.,	Lyngs,	U.,	Van	Kleek,	M.,	Zhao,	J.,	Libert,	T.,	&	Shadbolt,	N.	(2018).	Third	party	tracking	in	the	mobile	
ecosystem.	In		Proceedings	of	the	10th	ACM	Conference	on	Web	Science	(pp.	23-31).	ACM	;		Yu,	Z.,	Macbeth,	S.,	Modi,	K.,	
&	Pujol,	J.	M.	(2016).	Tracking	the	trackers.		In	Proceedings	of	the	25th	Interna onal	Conference	on	World	Wide	Web	
(pp.	121-132).	Interna onal	World	Wide	Web	Conferences	Steering	Commi ee	.	
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them.	This	in	turn	can	inﬂuence	and	shape	the	choices	that	are	made	as	we	navigate	online 
spaces.	Inﬂuential	commentators	such	as	Jaron	Lanier	see		‘behaviour	modiﬁcation	feedback 
loops’	as	a	key	component	of	online	targeting.  7
Targeting	aims	to	tailor	online	experiences… 
The	perceived	opportunity	with	targeting	lies	in	its	ability	to	give	people	relevant	content,	products 
and	information,	when	they	need	them.	It	can	be	used	to	improve	the	user	experience	and	has	the 
potential	to	speed	up	the	eﬃciency	of	transactions	between	consumer	and	company,	as	well	as 
citizen	and	institution. 
…	and	is	also	about	inﬂuencing	behaviour... 
Online	targeting	is	largely	enabled	by	the	combination	of	data	science	with	digital	marketing	and 
the	psychology	of	persuasion.	In	particular,	it	is	present	in	many	online	forms	of	marketing	and 
advertising	which		involve	the	monitoring	or	tracking	of	consumers’	online	behaviour.	This	tracking 
enables	the	collection	of	data,	which	informs	the	personalisation	of	adverts	through	‘programmatic 
targeting’, 	the	design	of	psychologically	‘persuasive	computing’	applications, 	and 8 9
recommendation	systems	like	those	used	by	Netﬂix,	Amazon	and	Spotify	which	point	users	in	the 
direction	of	products	or	content	which	they	may	be	interested	in. 
…	and	segmenting	markets 
Online	targeting	allows	price	discrimination	to	occur.	In	economics,	‘perfect	price	discrimination’	is 
where	every	consumer	pays	the	maximum	they	are	willing	to	pay	for	that	product,	leaving	the	seller 
with	maximum	proﬁt.	Before	heavy	personalisation,	this	type	of	price	discrimination	was	a	‘holy 
grail’,	but	as	individuals’	preferences	become	more	clear	and	they	can	be	targeted	at	low	cost,	it	is 
becoming	more	realistic.  10
New	technology	is	making	targeting	more	granular	and	personalised	according	to	behaviour 
With	the	rise	of	technologies	such	as	machine	learning,	online	targeting	is	becoming	increasingly 
granular	and	personalised	according	to	behaviour.	It	is	increasingly	based	on	an	‘audience	of	one’ 
model,	where	the	targeted	content	has	been	personalised	to	an	individual,	not	to	a	mass	audience 
or	a	demographic	target	group. 	It	is	also	becoming	more	automated,	predictive,	and	able	to 11
operate	across	devices	based	on	probabilistic	inferences	that	are	linked	to	the	same	person.   12
An	expanding	range	of	data	points	and	better	technology	are	enabling	deeper	inferences	to	be	made 
The	combination	of	multiple	data	points	including	social	media	data,	consumer	behaviour	data, 
web	browsing	data,	and	other	sources	of	behavioural	information,	is	making	it	possible	to	identify 
7	Lanier,	J.,	&	Euchner,	J.	(2019).	What	Has	Gone	Wrong	with	the	Internet,	and	How	We	Can	Fix	It:	An	Interview	with	
Jaron	Lanier.		Research-Technology	Management	,	62(3),	13-20.	
8	Boerman,	S.	C.,	Kruikemeier,	S.,	&	Zuiderveen	Borgesius,	F.	J.	(2017).	Online	behavioral	adver sing:	A	literature	review	
and	research	agenda.	Journal	of	Adver sing	,	46(3),	363-376.	
9	Fogg,	B.	J.	(1998,	January).	Persuasive	computers:	perspec ves	and	research	direc ons.		In	Proceedings	of	the	SIGCHI	
conference	on	Human	factors	in	compu ng	systems	.	ACM	Press/Addison-Wesley	Publishing	Co.	
10	Borgesius,	F.	Z.,	&	Poort,	J.	(2017).	Online	price	discrimina on	and	EU	data	privacy	law.		Journal	of	consumer	policy	,	
40(3),	347-366.	
11	Summers,	C.	A.,	Smith,	R.	W.,	&	Reczek,	R.	W.	(2016).	An	audience	of	one:	Behaviorally	targeted	ads	as	implied	social	
labels.	Journal	of	Consumer	Research	,	43(1),	156-178.	
12	Bartle ,	J.,	Smith,	J.,	&	Acton,	R.	(2018).	The	future	of	poli cal	campaigning.		Demos	,	available	at	
h ps://demos.co.uk/project/the-future-of-poli cal-campaigning/	[accessed	on:	11/07/19].	
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or	infer	peoples’	sentiments,	emotions,	interests,	preferences	and	personality	traits	as	well	as	their 
location,	movements,	demographics	and	socio-economic	contexts.  
Much	of	the	time,	however,	personalisation	tools	do	not	seek	to	explicitly	‘infer’	sensitive	data,	such 
as	demographic	information,	but	to	directly	optimise	for	some	goal	online,	such	as	the	number	of 
clicks	or	purchases	made.	Sensitive	data	might	be	used	indirectly, 	but	the	focus	from	the	point	of 13
view	of	the	targeting	organisation	is	what	type	of	optimisation	they	are	trying	to	do,	what	is	being 
considered	valuable,	and	what	is	not	being	optimised	for.  14
More	data	and	new	tools	have	ushered	in	what	some	have	described	as	a	form	of	‘digital	mass 
persuasion.’ 	This	enables	organisations	to		target	individuals	with	more	relevant	and	persuasive 15
products,	services,	and	recommendations	for	purchase	or	consumption. 	These	same	insights 16
can	also	enable	governments	and	other	organisations	to	target	people	directly	with	messages, 
content	and	other	communications.	Advances	in	algorithm	design,	machine	learning,	and 
predictive	data	analytics,	are	helping	make	sense	of	all	this	data.	Combined,	these	advances	are 
set	to	make	online	targeting	increasingly	pervasive	in	the	coming	years.  17
The	infographic	below	provides	a	basic	overview	of	the	different	types	of	data	used	to	target	an 
individual	today.	The	left	hand	side	of	the	image	shows	more	traditional	sources	of	data,	while	the 
right	covers	newer	sources.	All	of	this	data	is	used	in	different	combinations	in	online	targeting. 
 
Image	1:		Different	levels,	realms	and	sources	of	corporate	consumer	data	collection.		From	Cracked	Labs 
(2017).		Corporate	Surveillance	in	Everyday	Life	.	(c)	Cracked	Labs	CC	BY-SA	4.0. 
13	Barocas,	S.,	&	Selbst,	A.	D.	(2016).	Big	data's	disparate	impact.		Calif.	L.	Rev.	,	104,	671.	
14	Overdorf,	R.,	Kulynych,	B.,	Balsa,	E.,	Troncoso,	C.,	&	Gürses,	S.	(2018).	POTs:	Protec ve	Op miza on	Technologies.	
arXiv	preprint	arXiv:1806.02711.	
15	The	eﬀec veness	of	this	‘digital	mass	persuasion’	is	discussed	in:	Matz,	S.	C.,	Kosinski,	M.,	Nave,	G.,	&	S llwell,	D.	J.	
(2017).	Psychological	targe ng	as	an	eﬀec ve	approach	to	digital	mass	persuasion.		In	Proceedings	of	the	na onal	
academy	of	sciences	,	114(48),	12714-12719.	
16	Kim,	T.,	Barasz,	K.,	&	John,	L.	K.	(2018).	Why	am	I	seeing	this	ad?	The	eﬀect	of	ad	transparency	on	ad	eﬀec veness.	
Journal	of	Consumer	Research	,	45(5),	906-932.	
17	Stan,	S.	(2018).	How	Can	Data	Science,	Machine	Learning	And	AI	Improve	Ad	Targe ng?		Cogne k	,	available	at:	
h ps://cogne k.com/how-can-data-science-machine-learning-and-ai-improve-ad-targe ng/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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2.1.	What	kinds	of	online	targeting	are	used	and	how	do	they	work? 
Different	types	of	online	targeting 
For	the	purposes	of	this	review,	we	will	be	focusing	on	three	of	the	primary	ways	in	which	content 
can	be	targeted:		behavioural	targeting,		demographic	targeting,	and		psychographic	targeting.  
We	go	into	more	detail	about	some	of	the	types	of	data	each	targeting	approach	uses,	as	well	as 
who	they	target	and	how.	However,	while	there	are	differences	between	these	approaches,	they	are 
often	used	in	combination	and	increasingly	leverage	a	wide	range	of	data	points.	When	these 
approaches	are	used,	often	in	concert,	to	segment	people	into	(often	very	speciﬁc)	groups,	or	even 
as	individuals,	this	is	known	as	micro-targeting.  
 
Demographic	targeting 
One	of	the	earliest	approaches	to	targeted	marketing,	which	predates	the	internet,	is	demographic 
targeting.	This	uses	demographic	categories	such	as	age,	gender,	income,	occupation,	social	class, 
and	location,	in	order	to	break	up	the	population	of	internet	users	into	demographic	groups	which 
can	then	be	used	to	target	content	at	those	groupings.  18
Behavioural	targeting 
Behavioural	targeting	was	one	of	the	earliest	forms	of	targeting	to	develop	on	the	Internet. 	In	its 19
simplest	form,	behavioural	targeting	is	the	practice	of	learning	from	previous	behavioural	traits	and 
patterns,	in	order	to	target	experiences,	content	or	ideas	to	individuals.	It	involves	using	past 
historical	data	to	determine	when	exactly	to	deliver	these	experiences	at	a	time	and	context	when 
they	will	be	most	effective,	persuasive,	and	inﬂuential. 
It	draws	on	an	extensive	range	of	data,	including	data	obtained	from	people’s	browsing	history, 
search	engine	queries,	and	ads	that	they	have	previously	clicked	on,	as	well	as	potentially	any	form 
of	interaction	a	person	engages	in	on	the	internet.  
Psychographic	targeting 
The	mapping	of	user	interests	and	personality	traits	is	known	as	psychographics	and	is	a	way	of 
identifying	audience	segments	that	adds	to	older	demographic	methods.	Whereas	demographic 
models	categorise	in	terms	of	age,	gender	and	location,	psychographic	models	seek	to	categorise 
in	terms	of	attitudes	and	lifestyle.  
Such	data	was	previously	gathered	through	processes	such	as	consumer	surveys.	Today,	the 
ability	to	capture	not	only	mouse	clicks	(and	even	the	time	an	individual	hovers	their	mouse	cursor 
over	a	particular	option)	but	also	information	provided	by	users	on	search	forms,	forums	and	social 
media,	has	vastly	increased	the	capacity	of	such	targeting.	Recording	search	engine	queries 
18	There	are	various	descrip ons	of	demographic	targe ng	available.	See	for	example	this	outline	of	the	use	of	
demographic	targe ng	in	adver sing	provided	by	Know	Online	Adver sing,	available	at:	
h p://www.knowonlineadver sing.com/targe ng/demographic-targe ng/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
19	Chen,	Y.,	Pavlov,	D.,	&	Canny,	J.	F.	(2009,	June).	Large-scale	behavioral	targe ng.		In	Proceedings	of	the	15th	ACM	
SIGKDD	interna onal	conference	on	Knowledge	discovery	and	data	mining	(pp.	209-218)	.	ACM.		
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provides	detailed	psychographic	proﬁles	of	people’s	interests	and	popular	trends.	And	the	ability	to 
map	this	in	real-time	means	corresponding	searches	can	also	be	combined	to	create	insights.   20
Facebook,	for	example,	builds	psychographic	models	into	its	basic	advertising	interface	drawing 
upon	the	Pages,	ads	and	websites	that	users	have	liked. 	Whereas	search	engine	data	can	provide 21
information	on	people’s	intentions,	data	on	likes	can	build	up	a	more	detailed	picture	of	a	person’s 
lifestyle	and	interests.  22
Micro-targeting 
The	detailed	information	available	from	user-generated	content	on	social	media,	combined	with 
other	forms	of	demographic,	behavioral	and	psychographic	targeting,	has	fuelled	the	growth	of 
micro-targeting.	Micro-targeting	builds	upon	the	kinds	of	data	and	processes	used	in	behavioural 
targeting,	including	clickbait,	but	seeks	to	make	far	more	granular	segmentation	of	the	audience, 
dividing	people	into	ever	smaller	and	tightly	deﬁned	groups.   23
Micro-targeting	enables	messages	to	be	delivered	at	time-critical	moments	to	highly	selective 
audiences.	A	prominent	example	of	this	tailored	messaging	is	in	political	campaigning.	To	some 
extent,	micro-targeting	can	be	thought	of	as	analogous	to	door-to-door	canvassing	seen	in 
traditional	campaigning	but	capable	of	operating	at	a	vastly	increased	scale	and	speed,	and	at 
time-critical	junctures,	making	it	highly	desirable	to	large	and	complex	national	campaigns. 
However,	it	differs	in	certain	key	respects—online	targeting	in	general,	and	micro-targeting	in 
particular,	can	be	done	remotely	and	far	more	anonymously	than	traditional	forms	of	political 
campaigning	and	canvassing.	It	has	also	created	opportunities	for	anonymous	voter	suppression, 
allowing	campaigners	to	spread	negative	messages	about	their	opponents,	or	messages	designed 
to	discourage	voter	turnout	among	particular	groups.	These	aspects	have	led	to	concerns	about	its 
exploitation	as	a	medium	for	disinformation	and	foreign	intervention.   24
Platforms	such	as	Facebook	also	offer	features	such	as	‘Custom	Audiences’	and	‘Lookalike 
Audiences’,	which	have	been	used	by	political	campaigns	and	other	groups	to	target	particular 
categories	of	people.	Researchers	have	noted	how	the	Custom	Audiences	feature	on	Facebook 
has	proved	attractive	to	advertisers,	some	of	whom	have	political	and/or	disruptive	agendas, 
because	it	allows	them	to	specify	a	particular	target	audience	for	their	adverts,	and	allows	them	to 
place	cookies	in	the	browsers	of	those	who	clicked	through,	facilitating	their	further	re-targeting.  25
Lookalike	Audiences	build	on	this	feature,	by	allowing	advertisers	to	target	similar	kinds	of 
audiences	to	their	speciﬁed	Custom	Audiences,	based	on	their	observed	behavioral	traits. 	Not 26
20	Gianne o,	D.	(2015).		Big	Social	Mobile:	How	Digital	Ini a ves	Can	Reshape	the	Enterprise	and	Drive	Business	Results	.	
Springer.	
21	Diamond,	S.,	&	Haydon,	J.	(2018).		Facebook	Marke ng,	6th	Edi on	.	Wiley.	
22	Gerlitz,	C.,	&	Helmond,	A.	(2013).	The	like	economy:	Social	bu ons	and	the	data-intensive	web.		New	media	&	
society	,	15(8),	1348-1365.	
23		Big	Data	refers	to	the	analysis	of	large	sta s cal	data	sets	and	Machine	Learning	to	the	ability	of	computer	
programmes	ac ng	upon	this	to	adjust	and	modify	themselves	in	response	to	the	data.	
24	Cadwalladr,	C.	(2017).	The	great	Bri sh	Brexit	robbery:	how	our	democracy	was	hijacked.		The	Guardian	,	7;	Woolley,	
S.	C.,	&	Howard,	P.	N.	(Eds.).	(2018).		Computa onal	propaganda:	poli cal	par es,	poli cians,	and	poli cal	manipula on	
on	social	media	.	Oxford	University	Press.	
25	Wood,	A.	K.,	&	Ravel,	A.	M.	(2017).	Fool	Me	Once:	Regula ng	Fake	News	and	Other	Online	Adver sing.		S.	Cal.	L.	Rev.	,	
91,	1223.	
26	Shadmy,	T.	(2018).	The	New	Social	Contract:	Facebook's	Community	and	Our	Rights.	
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only	is	there	evidence	that	these	features	have	been	abused	by	those	seeking	to	surreptitiously 
target	particular	groups	with	misinformation, 	there	are	also	implications	for	social	and	legal 27
equality,	as	products	and	services	can	be	targeted	(or	excluded)	from	particular	groups	in	ways 
which,	while	observing	the	letter	of	current	equality	legislation,	do	not	observe	its	spirit. 	They	are 28
unlikely,	however,	to	obey	data	protection	legislation	in	many	cases,	as	the	ICO	has	noted	that 
inferred	sensitive	data,	including	ethnicity,	sexuality,	political	opinion	and	health,	in	behavioural 
advertising	falls	under	the	same	provisions	as	collecting	that	data	directly,	and	requires	explicit 
consent	of	the	data	subject	that	can	be	refused.  29
Contextual	targeting 
When	discussing	methods	of	targeting	it	is	also	important	to	consider	the	practice	of	contextual 
targeting.	Contextual	targeting	focuses	on	displaying	adverts	based	on	the	context	and	content	of 
a	website,	in	order	to	try	and	target	a	relevant	audience. 	For	example,	an	airline	may	advertise 30
ﬂights	on	a	travel	blog	website.	This	approach	is	similar	to	how	print	adverts	may	be	placed	within 
niche	magazines	in	order	to	reach	a	speciﬁc	demographic	and	is	a	method	used	by	video	adverts 
on	YouTube	and	Google’s	AdSense	system.  31
Contextual	targeting	may	be	either	category	or	key-word	based.	Within	category	contextual 
targeting	adverts	are	placed	on	webpages	which	have	been	sorted	into	pre-assigned	categories; 
whereas	keyword	contextual	targeting	places	adverts	based	on	matches	with	speciﬁc	keywords. 
Contextual	targeting	differs	from	behavioural	targeting	in	that	it	does	not	consider	an	individual’s 
browser	or	purchase	history;	therefore,	it	does	not	require	access	to	the	personal	data	of	users	on 
a	website.	As	such,	some	reports	suggest	that	companies	are	increasing	their	use	of	contextual 
targeting	in	an	effort	to	ensure	that	they	do	not	breach	GDPR.  32
2.2.	How	pervasive	is	online	targeting? 
It	is	diﬃcult	to	get	precise	ﬁgures	for	the	exact	amount	of	targeting	taking	place	and	to	what	extent 
different	forms	of	it	are	used.	However,	viewed	from	a	macro	perspective,	whilst	targeting 
techniques	may	have	been	perfected	in	the	online	advertising	industry,	they	are	also	being 
deployed	across	private	and	public	sectors.	Image	3below	provides	an	indication	of	the	scale	of 
use	across	industries	and	the	public	sector. 
 
27	Wood,	A.	K.,	&	Ravel,	A.	M.	(2017).	Fool	Me	Once:	Regula ng	Fake	News	and	Other	Online	Adver sing.		S.	Cal.	L.	Rev.	,	
91,	1223.	
28	Wachter,	S.	(2019).	Aﬃnity	Proﬁling	and	Discrimina on	by	Associa on	in	Online	Behavioural	Adver sing.		
29	Informa on	Commissioner’s	Oﬃce.	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding.	
30	Zhang,	K.,	&	Katona,	Z.	(2012).	Contextual	adver sing.		Marke ng	Science	,	31(6),	980-994.	
31	Google	(2019).	Ad	Targe ng:	How	ads	are	targeted	to	your	site,	available	at:	
h ps://support.google.com/adsense/answer/9713?hl=en-GB	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
32	Davies,	J.	(2018).	Personaliza on	diminished:	In	the	GDPR	era,	contextual	targe ng	is	making	a	comeback.	
DigidayUK	,	available	at:	
h ps://digiday.com/media/personaliza on-diminished-gdpr-era-contextual-targe ng-making-comeback/		[accessed	
on:	27/06/19];	Wlosik,	M.,	&	Zawadziński,	M.	(2018).	What	is	Contextual	Targe ng	and	How	Does	It	Work?,	available	
at:		h ps://clearcode.cc/blog/contextual-targe ng/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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Image	2:	The	digital	tracking	and	proﬁling	landscape.	From	Cracked	Labs	(2017).		Corporate	Surveillance	in 
Everyday	Life	.	(c)	Cracked	Labs	CC	BY-SA	4.0. 
Focusing	on	a	number	of	speciﬁc	industries,	it	is	also	possible	to	see	a	steep	rise	in	the	adoption 
of	targeting	tools	and	techniques. 
Online	advertising 
Almost	all	online	advertising	is	targeted	to	some	extent	and	the	targeting	is	of	varying	degrees	of 
precision.	However	behavioural	targeting	is	part	of	the	basic	options	available	to	advertisers	on	the 
two	most	widely	used	platforms,	Facebook	and	Google. 
Investment	and	revenue	for	online	advertising	is	steadily	increasing,	with	the	Internet	Advertising 
Bureau	review	of	2018	showing	an	increase	in	online	advertising	revenues	of	22%	on	the	previous 
year	for	the	US. 	Unfortunately,	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	kinds	of	targeting	being	used	is	not 33
available	but	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	much	of	this	will	follow	the	models	being	promoted	by 
platforms	such	as	Facebook	and	Google.	There	are	also	a	growing	number	of	companies	providing 
33	PwC	&	Internet	Adver sing	Bureau.	(2018).	IAB	internet	adver sing	revenue	report:	2018	full	year	results,	available	
at:		h ps://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Full-Year-2018-IAB-Internet-Adver sing-Revenue-Report.pdf	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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specialist	consultancy	and	marketing	using	such	methods. 	Cambridge	Analytica	were	one	but 34
others	exist	such	as	Markovian	and	the	Rubicon	Project.  35
Political	campaigns 
Recent	research		has	shown	that	online	targeting,	and	forms	such	as	micro-targeting	in	particular, 
have	become	an	increasing	feature	of	political	campaigns.	The	Obama	campaign	of	2008	is	seen 
as	a	major	turning	point	towards	data-intensive	campaign	strategies. 	Research	on	political 36
campaigns	has	revealed	substantial	use	of	online	targeting	in	the	UK,	USA,	Russia,	Poland, 
Australia,	Brazil,	China	and	Taiwan. 	Facebook,	Google	and	Twitter	all	worked	closely	with 37
candidates	in	the	2016	US	elections	providing	embedded	teams	of	politically	sympathetic	staff.	In 
working	closely	with	such	embedded	teams,	candidates	with	smaller	budgets	have	managed	to 
out-perform	bigger	players.  38
Recommendation	and	ranking	systems 
Online	systems	that	prioritise	content	by	recommending	or	ranking	are	very	widespread.	Jennifer 
Cobbe	and	Jatinder	Singh	have	recently	explored	the	centrality	of	recommendation	systems	in	our 
online	environments.	Taking	the	thirty	most	visited	websites,	they	observe	that	‘recommending 
plays	a	central	role	across	the	most	popular	websites	and	platforms	on	the	internet’. 	The	most 39
well-known	examples	include	Amazon’s	system	for	recommending	books	and	other	products, 
Netﬂix’s	recommendations	of	ﬁlms,	Spotify’s	recommendations	for	music,	YouTube’s 
recommendations	for	videos,	and	Facebook	and	LinkedIn’s	friend	and	associate 
recommendations.  40
Major	expansion	in	data	creation,	collection	and	capture 
The	pervasiveness	of	targeting	is	closely	connected	to	the	wider	expansion	of	data	creation, 
collection	and	capture	methods.	These	have	expanded	as	innovations	in	online	media	and 
communication	have	evolved. 	They	include:	tracking	the	sites	someone	visits	as	they	browse	the 41
web,	through	cookies,	pixels	and	other	techniques;	storing	the	words	and	phrases	someone	enters 
into	a	search	engine;	and	gathering	content	created	by	users	in	online	forums	and	social	media 
platforms.  
34		Beer,	D.	(2018).		The	Data	Gaze:	Capitalism,	Power	and	Percep on	.	Sage.	
35	For	a	snapshot	of	the	ad-tech	industry,	available	at:	
h ps://chiefmartec.com/2017/05/marke ng-techniology-landscape-supergraphic-2017/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].		And	
for	an	example	of	‘algorithmic	adver sing’,	available	at:		h ps://markovian.com/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
36	Issenberg,	S.	(2012).	How	Obama’s	team	used	Big	Data	to	rally	voters.		Wired	[Online]	.	
37	Woolley,	S.	C.,	&	Howard,	P.	N.	(Eds.).	(2018).		Computa onal	propaganda:	poli cal	par es,	poli cians,	and	poli cal	
manipula on	on	social	media	.	Oxford	University	Press.	
38	Kreiss,	D.,	&	McGregor,	S.	C.	(2018).	Technology	ﬁrms	shape	poli cal	communica on:	The	work	of	Microso ,	
Facebook,	Twi er,	and	Google	with	campaigns	during	the	2016	US	presiden al	cycle.		Poli cal	Communica on	,		35	(2),	
155-177.	
39		Cobbe,	J.,	&	Singh,	J.	(2019).	Regula ng	Recommending:	Mo va ons,	Considera ons,	and	Principles.		Considera ons,	
and	Principles	.	
40		Beer,	D.	(2013).		Popular	culture	and	new	media:	The	poli cs	of	circula on	.	Springer.	
41		Turow,	J.	(2008).		Niche	envy:	Marke ng	discrimina on	in	the	digital	age	.	MIT	Press.	;		Wu,	T.	(2017).		The	a en on	
merchants:	The	epic	scramble	to	get	inside	our	heads	.	Vintage.	
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Location	and	image	data	feeding	into	online	targeting 
It	also	includes	increasing	amounts	of	location	and	image	data.	The	geographic	location	of	users 
can	be	gathered	from	the	IP	address	of	their	personal	computer,	the	cell	mast	location,	their	WI-FI 
network	or	GPS	coordinates	of	a	phone.	Information	can	be	gathered	from	photographs	using 
combinations	of	manual	tagging	by	users	and	AI-driven	image	recognition	systems.	A	wide	range 
of	data	sources	about	individuals	can	then	feed	into	online	targeting	processes. 
Scope	of	data	collection	extending	into	oﬄine	world 
The	scope	of	data	collection	has	also	extended	into	the	oﬄine	world	in	other	ways.	Smart	travel 
cards,	such	as	TFL’s	Oyster	travel	card,	map	people’s	journeys	on	public	transport.	Mobile	and 
wearable	computers	can	gather	biomedical	data	from	motion	and	temperature	sensors.  42
Home-based	smart	assistants	like	Amazon’s	Alexa	and	Google’s	Nest	gather	data	on	activities	and 
conditions,	such	as	electrical	consumption	in	the	home.	Shops	have	even	begun	to	install	sensor 
and	video	systems	employing	image	recognition	to	track	customers	as	they	move	around	the 
store. 	Some	of	these	systems	track	individuals	on	the	basis	of	their	biometric	features	in 43
combination	with	other	physical	features. 		This	is	the	data	rich	context	in	which	targeting	occurs 44
and	which	helps	strengthen	its	eﬃcacy	and	deepen	its	pervasiveness.     
2.3.	How	is	targeting	evolving? 
New	technologies,	more	social	data	and	new	insights	from	psychology	are	likely	to	make	targeting 
increasingly	social,	increasingly	based	on	human	emotion	and	increasingly	focused. 
Sentiment	analysis 
One	growth	area	is	likely	to	be	sentiment	analysis,	which	is	a	term	usually	derived	from	the	ﬁeld	of 
Natural	Language	Processing	(NLP).	This	determines	a	person’s	attitude	towards	something	based 
on	the	words	they	use	to	describe	it,	such	as	whether	their	language	reﬂects	a	more	positive, 
negative	or	neutral	attitude. 	For	political	campaigns,	it	can	be	used	to	understand	attitudes	and 45
emotions	to	different	messages	and	policies.	It	has	been	used	to	target	those	using	negative 
language	to	dissuade	support	for	something. 	While	sentiment	analysis	as	a	technique	has 46
typically	remained	focused	on	analysis	of	written	and	spoken	words,	some	research	has	also 
suggested	that	broader	forms	of	physiological	and	biometric	data,	ranging	from	the	tone	of	a 
person’s	voice	through	to	humanely	imperceivable	micro-expressions,	could	also	facilitate	the 
analysis	of	human	emotions	in	the	future.  47
42	Lupton,	D.	(2016).		The	quan ﬁed	self	.	John	Wiley	&	Sons.	
43		Turow,	J.	(2017).		The	aisles	have	eyes:	How	retailers	track	your	shopping,	strip	your	privacy,	and	deﬁne	your	power	.	
Yale	University	Press.	
44		Mavroudis,	V.,	&	Veale,	M.	(2018).	Eavesdropping	whilst	you're	shopping:	Balancing	personalisa on	and	privacy	in	
connected	retail	spaces.		In	Proceedings	of	the	PETRAS/IoTUK/IET	Living	in	the	Internet	of	Things	Con-	ference	.	
45	Kitchin,	R.	(2014).		The	data	revolu on:	Big	data,	open	data,	data	infrastructures	and	their	consequences	.	Sage.	
46		Kramer,	A.	D.,	Guillory,	J.	E.,	&	Hancock,	J.	T.	(2014).	Experimental	evidence	of	massive-scale	emo onal	contagion	
through	social	networks.		Proceedings	of	the	Na onal	Academy	of	Sciences	,		111	(24),	8788-8790	.	
47	However	this	is	generally	s ll	at	the	proof-of-concept	stage.	See	for	examples:		Burr,	C.,	Cris anini,	N.,	&	Ladyman,	J.	
(2018).	An	Analysis	of	the	Interac on	Between	Intelligent	So ware	Agents	and	Human	Users.		Minds	and	Machines	,	
28	(4),	735-774.	,	28(4),	735-774;		McDuﬀ,	D.,	El	Kaliouby,	R.,	Demirdjian,	D.,	&	Picard,	R.	(2013,	April).	Predic ng	online	
media	eﬀec veness	based	on	smile	responses	gathered	over	the	internet.	In		2013	10th	IEEE	interna onal	conference	
and	workshops	on	automa c	face	and	gesture	recogni on	(FG)	(pp.	1-7).	IEEE.	
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Dark	Ads 
Dark	advertising	is	a	type	of	advertising	where	the	messaging	can	only	be	seen	by	the	advertiser 
and	the	speciﬁc	target	group.	Dark	ads	were	introduced	to	enable	two	standard	advertising 
practices:	to	do	test	runs	of	ads	with	smaller	user	groups	and	to	enable	multiple	versions	of	the 
same	ad	to	be	targeted	to	different	audience	segments.	The	ability	to	hide	ads	from	the	Facebook 
Timeline	was	introduced	so	that	the	advertiser’s	page	did	not	quickly	become	overrun	with	multiple 
versions	of	the	same	ad. 	An	example	for	potential	misuse	came	to	light	in	the	disclosure	of 48
Facebook	adverts	from	Vote	Leave	in	the	2016	EU	referendum. 	This	indicates	the	potential	for 49
dark	adverts	to	lead	to	highly	individualised	online	experiences,	although	it	should	also	be	noted 
that	Facebook	has	since	responded	with	its	Ad	Transparency	initiative,	which	now	includes	a 
searchable	archive	of	all	active	advertising	on	its	platform. 	There	is	a	lack	of	accountability	and 50
transparency	in	the	targeting	of	information	in	this	way. 
Astroturﬁng 
As	the	example	of	social	inﬂuencers	demonstrates,	targeting	does	not	only	work	through	purely 
algorithmic	processes.	Getting	people	within	a	particular	audience	segment	to	talk	about	a 
particular	topic	with	the	intention	of	shaping	opinions	is	a	targeting	method	that	originated	in 
online	chatrooms	in	the	1990s. 	Similar	forms	of	targeting	continue	today	through	the 51
combination	of	automated	‘bots’	and	human	intervention	in	discussion	boards,	social	media 
groups	and	on	Twitter. 	This	form	of	targeting	can	seek	to	inﬂuence	grassroots	opinion	and	create 52
the	impression	of	popular	support,	a	process	known	as	‘	astroturﬁng	’.  53
Micro-targeted	videos	and	bespoke	adverts 
Micro-targeted	videos	are	also	emerging	as	a	signiﬁcant	new	step.	Campbell’s	SoupTube 
campaign	of	2016	used	Google’s	Director	Mix	system	to	generate	and	deliver	1,700	variations	of 
their	video	adverts	to	users	on	YouTube.	The	key	point	here	was	that	each	advert	was	tailored	to 
words	in	the	search	query	that	had	brought	them	to	the	main	video. 	The	system	incorporates	a 54
tool	called	Vogon	that	can	generate	dynamic	video	overlays	and	captions	in	response	to	audience 
segmentation	data.   55
Facebook	have	begun	to	incorporate	user	polls	into	video	ads	and	live	streaming	to	help	capture 
audience	reactions	and	ﬁne	tune	segmentation. 	As	AI	systems	become	better	at	producing 56
48	Loomer,	J.	(2013)	How	to	Use	Facebook	Power	Editor:	A	Detailed	Guide.		Social	Media	Examiner	.	
49	Digital,	Culture,	Media	and	Sport	Commi ee.	(2019).		Disinforma on	and	‘fake	news’:	Final	Report.	Eighth	Report	of	
Session	2017–19.	House	of	Commons.	
50	Cons ne,	J.	(2019).	Facebook	launches	searchable	transparency	library	of	all	ac ve	ads.		TechCrunch	,	available	at:	
h ps://techcrunch.com/2019/03/28/facebook-ads-library/	[accessed	on:	26/07/19].	
51	Turow,	J.	(2008).		Niche	envy:	Marke ng	discrimina on	in	the	digital	age	.	MIT	Press.	
52		Woolley,	S.	C.,	&	Howard,	P.	N.	(Eds.).	(2018).		Computa onal	propaganda:	poli cal	par es,	poli cians,	and	poli cal	
manipula on	on	social	media	.	Oxford	University	Press.	
53	Gorwa,	R.	(2018).	Poland.	Oxford	Scholarship	Online.	Oxford	University	Press;	Woolley,	S.	C.,	&	Howard,	P.	N.	(Eds.).	
(2018).		Computa onal	propaganda:	poli cal	par es,	poli cians,	and	poli cal	manipula on	on	social	media	.	Oxford	
University	Press;	McNamee,	R.	(2019).	Zucked:	waking	up	to	the	Facebook	catastrophe.	
54	Jolly,	D.	(2017).	Know	their	inten on,	get	their	a en on:	New	ways	to	connect	and	measure	on	YouTube.		Google	Ads	
Blog	,	available	at:		h ps://www.blog.google/products/ads/know-their-inten on-get-their/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
55	See		h ps://github.com/google/vogon	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
56	Hutchinson,	A.	(2018).	Facebook	Adds	New	Video	Tools	to	Foster	Community	Engagement.		Social	Media	Today	,	
available	at:	
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convincing	and	authentic	content,	dynamic,	bespoke	adverts	will	also	become	more	prevalent.	In 
Europe,	Sky	has	also	been	experimenting	with	similar	approaches,	with	its	AdSmart	system,	which 
allows	advertisers	to	tailor	their	campaigns	at	the	household	level	to	speciﬁc	audiences	in	select 
locations.  
Advances	in	NLP	will	enable	more	natural	speech	to	be	automatically	generated,	potentially 
allowing	more	sophisticated	and	tailored	text	content	that	will	move	beyond	the	current	use	of 
short	templated	messages. 	Forms	of	algorithmic	self-training	and	self-optimization	through 57
approaches	such	as	genetic	algorithms	(whereby	different	possible	solutions	are	set	to	‘compete’ 
with	one	another	until	the	most	eﬃcient	solution	is	found)	will	increase	the	scale	and	ﬂexibility	at 
which	algorithmically-driven	content	can	be	delivered	and	how	it	can	respond	to	targeted 
audiences.   58
The	impact	of	new	regulation 
It	is	too	early	to	assess	the	full	impact	of	the	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	(GDPR)	on 
targeted	advertising.	That	said,	two	recent	surveys,	one	by	marketing	agency	Smaato	and	another 
by	Advertiser	Perceptions	and	Trusted	Media	Brands,	show	movement	away	from	open 
marketplace	systems	for	online	advertising	and	towards	more	privacy	compliant	advertising.  59
These	privacy	compliant	systems	link	between	the	ad	broker	and	advertising	host	in	order	to	limit 
the	transmission	of	user	data,	known	as	a	“programmatic	guarantee”.	This,	in	principle,	should 
make	the	source	of	adverts	far	more	traceable	and	the	sharing	of	user	data	by	companies	more 
accountable. 
 
There	is	also	evidence	that	the	ICO	is	taking	a	more	interventionist	role	in	this	area	in	the	time 
since	the	GDPR	took	force,	while	the	public	are	becoming	more	aware	of	their	rights	and	more 
willing	to	pursue	complaints	against	those	who	infringe	on	them.	At	the	end	of	May	2019	the	ICO 
reported	that	they	had	over	41,000	data	protection	complaints	since	25	May	2018,	compared	with 
around	21,000	during	the	previous	year. 	Of	the	complaints	received	since	May	2018,	over	14,000 60
were	complaints	concerning	personal	data	breaches,	although	it	should	be	noted	that	most	of 
these	appeared	to	be	minor	in	nature—the	ICO	closed	around	12,000	within	the	year,	and	only 
around	17.5%	required	action	from	the	organisation.	Less	than	0.5%	led	to	either	an	improvement 
plan	or	civil	monetary	penalty.	However,	the	ICO	has	issued	15	assessment	notices	(which	allows 
them	to	audit	any	public	or	private	sector	organisation	for	data	protection	purposes)	under	the	new 
law	in	conjunction	with	their	investigations	into	data	analytics	for	political	purposes,	political 
h ps://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/facebook-adds-new-video-tools-to-foster-community-engagement/538708/	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
57	Mak,	A.	(2019).	When	Is	Technology	Too	Dangerous	to	Release	to	the	Public?	A	new	text-genera ng	algorithm	has	
reignited	a	long-running	debate.		Slate	;		Loizou,	N.,	Rabbat,	M.,	&	Richtárik,	P.	(2019,	May).	Provably	accelerated	
randomized	gossip	algorithms.	In		ICASSP	2019-2019	IEEE	Interna onal	Conference	on	Acous cs,	Speech	and	Signal	
Processing	(ICASSP).	IEEE.	
58		Miralles-Pechuán,	L.,	Ponce,	H.,	&	Mar nez-Villaseñor,	L.	(2018).	A	novel	methodology	for	op mizing	display	
adver sing	campaigns	using	gene c	algorithms.		Electronic	Commerce	Research	and	Applica ons	,		27	,	39-51.	
59	Smaato	(2018).	Global	trends	in	mobile	adver sing,	H2	2018.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.smaato.com/resources/reports/global-trends-report-h2-2018/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19];	
h ps://www.trustedmediabrands.com/programma c-in-the-era-of-transparency/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
60	ICO	(2019).	GDPR:	One	Year	On.	Available	at:	
h ps://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2614992/gdpr-one-year-on-20190530.pdf	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
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parties,	data	brokers,	credit	reference	agencies	and	others.	Information	Commissioner,	Elizabeth 
Denham,	also	signaled	the	ICO’s	intent	when	she	recently	stated	that	“many	of	the	investigations 
launched	with	our	new	powers	are	now	nearing	completion	and	we	expect	outcomes	soon”.  61
In	June	2019,	the	ICO	released	an	update	on	an	investigation	into	real-time	bidding	and	advertising 
technology	online.	In	this	document,	they	ﬁnd	‘systemic	concerns	around	the	level	of	compliance’ 
concerning	online	targeting,	ﬁnding	that	the	processing	of	data	is	carried	out	without	a	valid	lawful 
basis	under	the	GDPR	and	under	Privacy	and	Electronic	Communication	Regulations	(PECR);	that 
the	collection	and	inference	of	special	category	data	is	taking	place	without	the	required	explicit 
consent,	that	few	targeting	organisations	have	undertaken	the	required	data	protection	impact 
assessments	or	provided	suﬃcient	transparency,	that	proﬁles	generated	are	‘extremely	detailed 
and	are	repeatedly	shared	among	hundreds	of	organisations’	for	each	act	of	targeting,	with 
‘processing	billions	of	bid	requests	in	the	UK	each	week	with	(at	best)	inconsistent	application	of 
adequate	technical	and	organisational	measures	to	secure	the	data	in	transit	and	at	rest,	and	with 
little	or	no	consideration	as	to	the	requirements	of	data	protection	law	about	international	transfers 
of	personal	data’.	The	ICO	conclude	that	individuals	have	‘no	guarantees	about	the	security	of	their 
personal	data	within	the	ecosystem’.  62
 
Areas	for	future	research  
● We	understand	at	least	some	of	the	speciﬁc	ways	in	which	online	targeting	is	being	used, 
and	what	the	underlying	intentions	behind	these	are,	not	least	due	to	the	‘dark	ads’ 
scandals	of	the	last	few	years.	However,	this	is	likely	to	be	a	far	from	comprehensive 
understanding	of	current	and	future	applications	of	the	purposes	to	which	online 
targeting	is	being	put,	and	more	work	is	needed	to	map	these	uses. 
● It	is	clear	that	certain	broad	categories	of	data	are	being	used	to	fuel	online	targeting 
techniques	(e.g.	demographic,	behavioral	and	demographic	data),	but	this	is	a	far	from 
comprehensive	list,	and	we	need	a	better	understanding	of	where	data	is	being	collected 
from,	in	both	online	and	oﬄine	contexts. 
● The	wider	data	ecosystems	in	which	online	targeting	is	operating	is	also	poorly 
understood—there	is	much	more	to	learn	about	how	data	is	being	traded,	exchanged	and 
shared,	and	how	it	is	combined	and	reconﬁgured,	for	the	purposes	of	online	targeting.	We 
also	need	a	better	understanding	of	the	data	brokers	who	are	facilitating	these 
exchanges,	and	their	business	models. 
● We	know	to	some	extent	that	information	around	the	personality	traits	and 
characteristics	of	individuals	can	be	inferred	from	other	forms	of	data,	with	varying 
degrees	of	accuracy,	but	the	extent	of	these	practices,	and	where	and	why	they	are	being 
used,	is	still	largely	unknown. 
61	ICO	(2019).	GDPR:	One	Year	On.	Available	at:	
h ps://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2614992/gdpr-one-year-on-20190530.pdf	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
62	ICO	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding.		Informa on	Commissioner’s	Oﬃce	.	
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● While	marketers	and	other	emphasise	the	effectiveness	of	online	targeting	methods, 
there	is	still	very	little	in	the	way	of	empirical	assessments	to	support	these	claims,	and 
we	need	research	which	tests	these	claims,	and	works	out	which	techniques	are 
effective,	and	why.  
● Similarly,	the	effectiveness	of	micro-targeting	practices,	compared	with	more	traditional 
forms	of	targeting,	is	still	largely	untested. 
● There	is	much	more	to	know	about	new	and	emerging	forms	of	online	targeting,	and 
whether	there	may	be	forms	of	targeting	practices	of	which	we	are	unaware. 
● It	is	also	important	to	consider	the	effect	that	future	technologies,	for	example	5G,	the 
Internet	of	Things	and	smart	cities,	may	have	on	these	practices	in	coming	years. 
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3. What	do	we	know	about	how 
individuals	understand	and	feel	about 
online	targeting? 
	
	
 
Chapter	summary 
● Where	awareness	and	understanding	of	targeting	techniques	increases,	comfort	with	it 
decreases. 
● Privacy,	trust	in	organisations	and	control	over	data	use	are	crucial	to	shaping	how	people 
feel	about	online	targeting.	Trust	in	particular	types	of	organisations	is	important	in	the 
acceptance	of	the	data	sharing	processes	that	underpin	online	targeting. 
● There	appear	to	be	signiﬁcant	differences	in	attitude	towards	online	targeting	based	on 
age.	However,	there	is	little	understanding	of	how	perceptions	and	attitudes	to	online 
targeting	are	changing	over	time. 
● Research	tends	to	focus	on	online	advertising	and	contains	fewer	insights	on	other	forms 
of	online	targeting.	This	represents	a	signiﬁcant	gap	in	our	understanding. 
 
A	relatively	limited	number	of	surveys	suggest	that	public	understanding	of	the	extent	and	nature 
of	online	targeting	currently	being	practiced	is	relatively	limited.	However,	of	the	research	we	have, 
much	of	it	was	produced	prior	to	the	extensive	media	coverage	of	online	targeting	that	has 
occurred	over	the	last	two	years.	This	is	likely	to	have	had	a	direct	impact	both	on	what	people 
know	about	online	targeting	and	how	they	feel	about	it.  
This	problem	aside,	there	are	some	insights	available	in	the	existing	literature	that	give	a	sense	of 
what	people	know	of	the	way	targeting	happens	and	how	they	feel	about	it. 	This	is	clearly	an	area 63
in	which	further	work	will	be	required.	It	will	be	crucial	to	understand	public	perceptions	and 
feelings	towards	online	targeting	as	the	technologies	develop	and	as	the	inﬂuence	of	targeting 
processes	escalate. 
63		Kennedy,	H.	(2018).	Living	with	data:	Aligning	data	studies	and	data	ac vism	through	a	focus	on	everyday	
experiences	of	dataﬁca on.		Krisis:	Journal	for	Contemporary	Philosophy	,	(1).	The	broader	ideas	about	the	need	to	
develop	a	stronger	understanding	of	emo onal	engagements	with	data	in	the	context	of	everyday	life	is	explored	in	a	
further	ar cle:		Kennedy,	H.,	&	Hill,	R.	L.	(2018).	The	feeling	of	numbers:	Emo ons	in	everyday	engagements	with	data	
and	their	visualisa on.		Sociology	,		52	(4),	830-848.	
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3.1.	Awareness,	trust	and	sentiments 
Awareness 
A	2018	report	from	Doteveryone,	based	on	a	representative	survey	of	2500	people	(2000	by	online 
survey	and	500	by	phone),	found	that	45%	of	respondents	were	‘unaware	that	the	information	they 
enter	on	websites	and	social	media	can	help	target	ads’. 	In	addition	to	this,	the	same	report	also 64
found	that	62%	of	respondents	did	not	‘realise	that	their	social	networks	can	affect	the	news	they 
see’	and	that	47%	were	not	aware	of	how	price	changes	occurred	based	upon	data	gathered.	The 
Pew	Research	Centre	reached	similar	conclusions,	with	a	survey	of	respondents	in	the	US 
suggesting	that	around	53%	did		not	understand	the	role	of	algorithms	in	arranging	the	contents	of 
their	Facebook	newsfeeds.  65
This	suggests	that	although	there	are	relatively	wide	levels	of	awareness	of	online	targeting,	there 
is	a	still	a	substantial	proportion	of	the	population	that	have	little	or	no	understanding	of	targeting 
processes. 
The	same	report	also	found	that	‘almost	a	third	don’t	realise	that	the	things	that	they’ve	bought 
before	can	affect	what	ads	they	see	and	a	ﬁfth	haven’t	noticed	that	they’ve	received	advertising 
based	on	what	they’ve	previously	viewed	or	searched	for’. 	Together	these	insights	suggest	that 66
there	is	still	quite	limited	understanding	and	awareness	of	how	feedback	loops	of	data	are	used	to 
personalise	online	experiences.  
There	seems	to	be	even	less	awareness	of	how	pricing	can	be	variable	and	targeted,	with	only	21% 
being	‘aware	that	data	may	be	collected	so	that	companies	can	determine	the	price	they	are 
charged	for	a	product	or	service’.	This	would	suggest	that	some	types	of	targeting	have	a	higher 
level	of	public	awareness	than	others.  
A	number	of	surveys	have	identiﬁed	a	range	of	emotional	responses	to	online	targeting.	As	we 
shall	see,	the	degree	of	awareness	has	an	impact	on	these	emotional	responses. 
 
Trust 
Trust	in	organisations	is	important	in	shaping	attitudes	towards	data	sharing—a	key	process	of 
online	targeting.	Evidence	of	this	can	be	found	in	a	2018	survey	from	the	Open	Data	Institute	into 
attitudes	towards	data	sharing.   67
When	asked	how	important	trust	in	an	organisation/institution	was	when	it	came	to	sharing	data 
with	them,	75%	of	respondents	indicated	that	it	was	‘very	important’	and	a	further	19%	indicated	it 
64	Miller,	C.,	Coldicu ,	R.,	&	Kitcher,	H.	(2018).	People,	Power	and	Technology:	The	2018	Digital	Understanding	Report.	
Doteveryone	,	available	at	h ps:	//understanding.doteveryone.org.uk	
65	Smith,	P.	(2018).	Many	Facebook	users	don’t	understand	how	the	site’s	news	feed	works.		Pew	Research	Centre	,	
available	at:	
h ps://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/many-facebook-users-dont-understand-how-the-sites-news-fee
d-works/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
66	Miller,	C.,	Coldicu ,	R.,	&	Kitcher,	H.	(2018).	People,	Power	and	Technology:	The	2018	Digital	Understanding	Report.	
Doteveryone	,	available	at	h ps:	//understanding.doteveryone.org.uk	
67	The	Open	Data	Ins tute	(conducted	by	YouGov)	survey	‘A tudes	Towards	Data	Sharing’,	ODI,	2018.	The	full	data	set	
is	available	at:	
h ps://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1A_y1XioG2Y4gSy7wXE3kivE40ZiwXrpIbj-YujY_-CQ/edit#gid=471882920	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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was	fairly	important.	However,	the	importance	of	trust	varies	amongst	age	groups.	Only	58%	of 
both	the	18-24	and	the	25-34	age	groups	indicated	that	trust	in	an	organisation/institution	was 
‘very	important’	whereas	81%	of	45-54	year	olds	and	88%	of	55+	years	indicated	that	it	was	very 
important. 
 
Looking	at	the	same	survey,	if	we	examine	the	responses	to	the	two	types	of	organisation	that	are 
most	readily	linked	to	online	targeting	we	ﬁnd	the	following:	for	‘online	retailers’	22%	indicated	they 
would	trust	them	with	their	data.	Again	a	similar	generational	divide	exists	on	this	question,	with 
36%	of	18-24	year	olds	trusting	online	retailers	with	their	data	and	only	16%	of	those	55	and	over.  
Similarly,	for	social	media	organisations	only	10%	indicated	they	would	trust	them	with	their 
personal	data.	Social	media	presented	an	even	more	stark	generational	variation,	with	25%	of 
18-24	year	olds	trusting	them	with	their	data,	compared	to	only	5%	in	the	45-54	year	old	and	55 
year	old	and	over	categories.	Trust	in	organizations,	which	varies	substantially	across	age	groups 
and	organisation	type,	is	important	in	attitudes	to	online	targeting,	and	it	seems	that	it	is	relatively 
lacking	in	the	organisations	directly	associated	with	those	practices. 
 
Overall	negativity	towards	online	targeting 
A	survey	from	the	Open	Data	Institute	in	2018	identiﬁed	a	general	negativity	towards	online 
targeting.	Only	11%	of	respondents	indicated	agreement	with	the	statement,	‘I	would	share	data 
about	me	if	it	were	used	to	tailor	the	media	content	I	view	and	listen	to,	even	if	I	need	to	share 
information	about	my	likes	and	dislikes’.	Even	amongst	18-24	year	olds	only	26%	agreed,	with	9% 
amongst	the	45-54	age	group	and	6%	in	those	over	55	years	old.  
In	a	separate	Ipsos	survey	on	consumer	privacy	and	security,	it	was	found	that	only	5%	of	people 
felt	that	targeted	adverts	and	marketing	materials	beneﬁtted	them	a	‘great	deal’	–	43%	felt	it	was 
neither	of	beneﬁt	or	otherwise.   68
As	we	will	see	in	this	section,	despite	the	relative	enthusiasm	amongst	younger	age	groups	and 
despite	the	wide	scale	use	of	online	media	and	increasing	levels	of	awareness	around	data 
practices,	a	majority	of	people	are	still	uncomfortable	with	the	idea	of	online	targeting. 
 
Increased	knowledge	of	online	targeting	can	increase	uneasiness,	discomfort	and	a	loss	of	control 
In	2016	Ipsos	Global	Trends	reported	that	in	Great	Britain	40%	of	respondents	agreed	with	the 
statement	‘I	am	comfortable	providing	information	about	myself	to	companies	who	are	online,	in 
return	for	personalised	services	and	products’.	49%	disagreed,	placing	Great	Britain	in	line	with 
many	European	nations. 	Doteveryone’s	survey	also	found	that	‘people	ﬁnd	targeted	advertising 69
disconcerting	and	it	makes	them	feel	uneasy’,	with	as	many	as	47%	of	their	respondents	saying 
that	they	have	negative	feelings	about	receiving	targeted	advertising. 	One	interpretation	is	that 70
68	Ipsos.	(2016).	Digital	Footprints:	Consumer	concerns	about	privacy	and	security.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.communica onsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/digital-footprints-ﬁnal-november-2016.pdf	[accessed	
on:	27/06/19].	
69	Ipsos.	(2016).	Digital	Footprints:	Consumer	concerns	about	privacy	and	security.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.communica onsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/digital-footprints-ﬁnal-november-2016.pdf		[accessed	
on:	27/06/19].	
70		Miller,	C.,	Coldicu ,	R.,	&	Kitcher,	H.	(2018).	People,	Power	and	Technology:	The	2018	Digital	Understanding	Report.	
Doteveryone	,	available	at	h ps:	//understanding.doteveryone.org.uk	
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levels	of	‘comfort’	with	online	targeting	could	change	when	awareness	of	targeting	practices 
increases. 
The	2018		Which?	report	‘	Control,	Alt	or	Delete?	The	future	of	consumer	data	’	was	based	on 
telephone	interviews	and	a	series	of	face-to-face	workshops	with	2,064	UK	adults. 	The	report 71
found	a	general	awareness	that	targeting	was	going	on	in	advertising,	but	that	knowledge	of	the 
detail	was	very	limited.	Crucially,	they	also	found	that	‘people	become	more	concerned	as	they 
learn	about	the	other	uses	of	data,	how	targeting	happens	and	how	the	use	of	the	data	could	affect 
them’.  
It	would	seem	that	knowledge	of	the	details	of	targeting	can	increase	feelings	of	concern	and 
discomfort	with	it.	Once	the	processes	of	proﬁling	and	targeting	had	been	explained	to	those 
attending	the	workshops	they	found	that	people	were	“surprised	about	the	extent	and	detail	of	their 
‘digital	self’’’.	On	discovery	of	these	proﬁling	and	targeting	activities	the	workshop	participants 
became	more	cautious	and	anxious.	They	found	that,	‘for	some,	this	crosses	the	line	of 
acceptability	by	making	them	feel	they	are	not	in	control	of	information	about	themselves’.  
As	well	as	a	perceived	loss	of	control,	they	add	that	‘many	participants	reported	feeling	uncertain 
about	how	this	amount	of	information	could	be	used	in	their	best	interests,	and	that	they	felt	their 
privacy	has	been	invaded’.	Increased	awareness	can	lead	to	a	reduced	sense	of	control	and	of 
privacy.	The		Which?	report	observes	that	those	who	began	with	more	tolerant	attitudes	switched	to 
more	negative	attitudes	once	they	were	more	informed	of	the	extent	and	type	of	proﬁling	and	data 
use	that	takes	place.  
These	ﬁndings	were	conﬁrmed	by	the	ICO,	who	in	March	2019	released	a	report	undertaken 
collaboratively	with	Ofcom,	where	they	surveyed	1690	individuals	in	the	United	Kingdom	on	their 
views	on	targeting	and	adtech	online.	Before	they	were	given	a	basic	description	of	how	the 
‘real-time	bidding’	for	advertising	space	using	personal	data	works,	63%	found	it	acceptable	that 
websites	display	targeted	adverts	in	order	to	remain	free	to	use	(14%	unacceptable).	After	being 
shown	a	basic	overview	of	how	the	targeting	ecosystem	functioned,	these	numbers	ﬂipped,	with 
more	participants	(43%)	ﬁnding	it	unacceptable	that	targeting	functioned	in	this	way	than	those 
who	found	it	acceptable	(36%).	This	represents	a	drop	of	43%	in	those	who	ﬁnd	targeting	as	it 
stands	acceptable	after	learning	more	about	it.  72
The	link	between	levels	of	awareness	and	increased	unease/discomfort,	is	an	aspect	that	should 
interest	policy	makers	and	other	oﬃcials	weighing	up	policies	to	manage	online	targeting.  73
Investment	in	resources	that	improve	awareness	and	understanding	of	processes—so	called	‘data 
literacy’—could	be	an	effective	means	of	managing	online	targeting. 
71	Which?	(2018).	Control,	Alt	or	Delete?:	The	future	of	consumer	data.		Available	at:	
h ps://www.which.co.uk/policy/digi sa on/2659/control-alt-or-delete-the-future-of-consumer-data-main-report	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
72		Informa on	Commissioner’s	Oﬃce	and	Ofcom.	(2019).	Adtech:	Market	Research	Report,	available	at:	
h ps://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2614568/ico-ofcom-adtech-research-20190320.pdf		[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
73	Gray,	J.,	Gerlitz,	C.,	&	Bounegru,	L.	(2018).	Data	infrastructure	literacy.		Big	Data	&	Society	,		5	(2).	
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Stereotyping	and	reductive	proﬁling 
Taina	Bucher’s	qualitative	research	on	everyday	experiences	of	algorithmic	intervention,	notes	how 
individuals	can	become	uncomfortable	with	the	labels	that	seem	to	get	attached	to	them	by	online 
targeting. 	When	individuals	receive	targeted	content	that	appears	to	reinforce	a	particular 74
character	proﬁle	which	they	feel	does	not	ﬁt	them,	it	can	lead	to	frustration	and	annoyance	at	the 
way	they	are	being	depicted	and	the	restrictive	assumptions	being	made	about	them.	The	result	is 
that	they	feel	pigeonholed. 
Lack	of	nuance	and	contextual	intelligence 
As	well	as	stereotyping,	Bucher’s	research	reveals	how	targeting	can	act	in	crude	ways,	which 
further	damages	the	relationship	with	the	user.	For	example	the	targeting	of	memories	on	social 
media	has	caused	upset,	particularly	when	systems	inappropriately	return	an	individual	to	diﬃcult 
moments,	such	as	bereavements	and	break-ups. 	This	suggests	that	many	systems	are 75
considered	to	be	lacking	in	the	contextual	sensitivities	required	to	avoid	making	inappropriate	and 
clumsy	decisions. 
Privacy	concerns 
A	survey	conducted	to	explore	attitudes	to	what	was	referred	to	as	‘online	behavioural	advertising’ 
by	Chang-Dae	Ham,	found	that	a	key	concern	was	raised	around	consumer	privacy. 	This	survey	of 76
442	people	found	where	there	is	awareness	of	targeting,	users	ﬁnd	ways	to	assess	risk,	develop 
coping	strategies	and	avoid	the	adverts	where	they	feel	it	is	necessary	to	do	so.  
Importantly	Ham’s	research	also	found	that	users	are	more	likely	to	seek	to	avoid	targeted	adverts 
if	they	recognise	the	greater	use	of	‘covert	persuasion	tactics’.	The	key	point	here	is	that	more 
obvious	attempts	to	manipulate	behaviour	are	likely	to	make	the	user	uncomfortable	and	lead	to 
avoidance	strategies.  
An	earlier	survey	study	by	Tae	Hyun	Baek	and	Mariko	Morimoto	similarly	found	that	scepticism 
towards	targeted	adverts	was	partially	involved	in	the	avoidance	of	adverts.	In	this	case	they	found 
that	privacy	concerns	and	irritation	has	a	direct	effect	on	the	avoidance	of	adverts.  
 
However,	they	add,	where	the	targeting	is	felt	to	be	accurate	in	its	personalisation	it	tends	to	be 
better	received.	So	the	more	tailored	and	appropriate	the	advert	to	the	individual,	the	less	likely 
individuals	will	try	to	avoid	those	adverts.   77
In	addition	to	the	above,	a	second	Which?	report,	found	that	rather	than	becoming	resigned	to	the 
use	of	their	data	in	targeted	advertising,	individuals	instead	seek	to	manage	their	privacy	through	a 
form	of	‘rational	disengagement’	with	that	content.	This	‘rational	disengagement’	occurs	where 
individuals	conclude	that	the	costs	of	engaging	with	the	targeted	content	are	greater	than	the 
beneﬁts.  78
74	Bucher,	T.	(2018).		If...	Then:	Algorithmic	power	and	poli cs	.	Oxford	University	Press.	
75	Bucher,	T.	(2018).		If...	Then:	Algorithmic	power	and	poli cs	.	Oxford	University	Press.	
76	Ham,	C.	D.	(2017).	Exploring	how	consumers	cope	with	online	behavioral	adver sing.		Interna onal	Journal	of	
Adver sing	,		36	(4),	632-658.	
77	Baek,	T.	H.,	&	Morimoto,	M.	(2012).	Stay	away	from	me.		Journal	of	adver sing	,		41	(1),	59-76.	
78	Which?	and	Britainthinks.	(2018).	Control,	Alt	or	Delete?	Consumer	research	on	a tudes	to	data	collec on,	available	
at:	
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Other	emotional	responses	to	online	targeting 
Elsewhere,	it	has	been	indicated	that	people	experience	a	form	of	‘data	anxiety’	or	even	an 
‘algorithmic	paranoia’	when	it	comes	to	the	safety,	security	and	use	of	their	data. 	The	key	ﬁnding 79
here	is	that	people	build	routines,	such	as	using	ad-blockers,	when	they	feel	their	data	is	being	used 
in	a	detrimental	way. 
Ruckenstein	and	Granroth	conducted	detailed	interviews	with	25	people	in	Finland	about	their 
experiences	of	targeting	and	algorithmic	systems. 	They	found	three	emotional	responses	that 80
could	be	used	to	understand	how	people	react	to	online	targeting:		fear	,		irritation	and		pleasure	. 
Fear 
Ruckenstein	and	Granroth	identify	how	a	sense	of	fear	is	provoked	when	people	feel	that	targeting 
in	some	way	oversteps	or	misuses	their	connections	with	organisations	online.	This	is	particularly 
apparent	when	these	connections	are	based	on	intimate	knowledge	of	our	lives,	including	our 
social	connections	and	consumption	habits.  
Irritation 
Even	though	respondents	occasionally	indicate	that	accurate	targeting	can	be	pleasurable,		they	do 
report	feeling	irritation	when	targeting	is	perceived	to	be	misplaced .	As	Ruckenstein	and	Granroth 81
put	it,	irritation	is	felt	when	the	‘market	fails	to	see	me’.	This	observation	relates	to	the	earlier	points 
about	being	seen	as	a	type	or	a	proﬁle	rather	than	as	an	individual	person.  
Pleasure 
Interviewees	also	indicate	pleasure	in	the	way	that	targeting	mediates	their	encounters	with	the 
market,	especially	where	the	targeting	triggers	a	‘feeling	of	recognition’.	This	suggests	that 
pleasure	can	be	derived	where	the	adverts	match	closely	with	their	interests	and	displays	a 
familiarity	with	them. 
Changing	perceptions	and	trends	in	attitudes	to	online	targeting 
It	is	diﬃcult	to	measure	how	perceptions	and	attitudes	are	changing	over	time.	A	substantial 
proportion	of	the	information	in	this	report	was	gathered	prior	to	the	frequent	news	coverage	of 
data	misuse,	fake	news	and	hacking	scandals.	These	events	may	well	have	signiﬁcantly	changed 
public	perceptions.	Given	this	coverage	and	other	factors,	attitudes	and	feelings	to	targeting	will 
not	be	ﬁxed	or	stable	and	currently,	it	is	an	area	that	the	existing	research	leaves	us	unable	to 
assess.  
Beyond	differences	in	age,	the	evidence	of	demographic	differences	(such	as	in	gender	or	location) 
in	understandings	and	attitudes	towards	online	targeting	as	a	speciﬁc	phenomenon	is	limited	and 
where	it	is	available	it	lacks	nuance.  
h ps://www.which.co.uk/policy/digi sa on/2707/control-alt-or-delete-consumer-research-on-a tudes-to-data-colle
c on-and-use	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
79	Pink,	S.,	Lanzeni,	D.,	&	Horst,	H.	(2018).	Data	anxie es:	ﬁnding	trust	in	everyday	digital	mess.		Big	Data	&	Society	,		5	(1),	
2053951718756685;	McQuillan,	D.	(2016).	Algorithmic	paranoia	and	the	convivial	alterna ve.		Big	Data	&	Society	,		3	(2).	
80	Ruckenstein,	M.,	&	Granroth,	J.	(2019).	Algorithms,	adver sing	and	the	in macy	of	surveillance.		Journal	of	Cultural	
Economy	,	1-13.	
81	Ruckenstein,	M.,	&	Granroth,	J.	(2019).	Algorithms,	adver sing	and	the	in macy	of	surveillance.		Journal	of	Cultural	
Economy	,	1-13.	
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3.2.	How	do	public	attitudes	vary	between	different	types	of	online	targeting? 
A	review	of	the	literature	has	found	very	little	research	measuring	how	public	attitudes	vary 
between	different	types	of	online	targeting.	The	lack	of	research	in	this	area	represents	a 
signiﬁcant	opportunity	to	assess	how	public	attitudes	and	perceptions	vary	across	different 
applications	of	online	targeting.	At	the	moment,	most	research	is	focused	on	online	targeting	in 
regards	to	advertising.	In	the	future	it	will	be	important	to	understand	attitudes	towards	targeting	in 
other	areas,	such	as	electoral	campaigns	and	public	debate. 
3.3.	What	does	the	public	think	about	potential	trade-offs? 
The	trade-offs	of	online	targeting	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	what	is	given	up	in	order	to	access 
services	and	products.	The	above	sections	provide	a	range	of	insights	into	attitudes	towards	the 
costs	and	beneﬁts	of	online	targeting.	What	this	suggests	is	that	attitudes	to	online	targeting 
cannot	be	disaggregated	from	their	view	of	the	perceived	trade-offs	involved.	The	combination	of 
ﬁndings	from	Ruckenstein	and	Granroth’s	study	reveals	that,	as	they	put	it,	users	potentially 
sometimes	want	‘contradictory	things’. 	Their	research	found	that	there	was	a	line	beyond	which 82
the	surveillance	behind	online	targeting	felt	‘creepy’	and	‘intrusive’.	Yet	at	other	times	they	found 
the	lack	of	knowledge	their	targeted	service	had	about	them	as	‘distressing’. 
A	report	by	Turow	et	al	(2015)	challenges	the	view	of	a	trade-off,	instead	suggesting	that	the 
majority	of	people	are	already	resigned	to	having	to	give	up	their	data	and	that	this	is	why	many 
may	appear	to	be	in	a	trade-off-	while	in	reality	they	feel	as	though	they	have	no	choice,	leading	to 
the	term	“trade-off	fallacy”.	As	an	alternative	they	proposed	a	“resignation	hypothesis”. 	Their 83
hypothesis	suggests	that	the	public	ﬁnds	corporations	use	of	their	data	undesirable	but	feel 
powerless	to	stop	it.	Of	1,506	American	adults	surveyed	they	reported	that	54%	were	deemed 
“resigned”	and	of	those	a	further	41%	were	concerned	“that	the	basic	dynamics	of	the	emerging 
marketplace	will	cause	them	injury”.	Furthermore,	they	found	that	72%	of	surveyed	Americans 
rejected	the	statement	that	“what	companies	know	about	me	from	my	behavior	online	cannot	hurt 
me”.	The	authors	do	not	dispute	that	customers	may	want	online	personalisation	or	that	they	may 
be	willing	to	share	some	data;	however,	they	highlight	the	general	perception	among	consumers 
does	not	ﬁt	with	the	widespread	idea	amongst	marketers	of	a	“trade-off”. 
In	addition,	the	recent	ICO	report	on	real-time	bidding	highlights	that	many	members	of	the	public 
may	not	even	realise	that	they	are	being	targeted	at	all;	therefore,	they	can	not	be	taking	part	in	a 
meaningful	trade-off.  84
The	key	ﬁnding	here	is	that	the	trade-offs	faced	by	the	public,	society	and	corporations	are	not 
always	balanced	and	in	some	cases	individuals	may	not	even	know	that	they	are	taking	place	at	all. 
In	addition,	individuals	may	want	the	targeting	systems	to	know	them	well	enough	to	deliver	ﬁtting 
82	Ruckenstein,	M.,	&	Granroth,	J.	(2019).	Algorithms,	adver sing	and	the	in macy	of	surveillance.		Journal	of	Cultural	
Economy	,	1-13.	
83	Turow,	J.,	Hennessy,	M.,	&	Draper,	N.	(2015).	The	tradeoﬀ	fallacy:	How	marketers	are	misrepresen ng	American	
consumers	and	opening	them	up	to	exploita on.	Available	at	SSRN	2820060.	
84		ICO	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding.	Available	at	
h ps://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real- me-bidding-report-201906.pdf	[accessed	
on	08/07/19].	
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and	appropriate	personalised	content	(although	this	may	be	achieved	through	other	means,	such 
as	contextual	targeting,	without	the	use	of	their	personal	data).	Yet	at	the	same	time	they	are 
fearful	and	unsettled	by	the	surveillance	required	to	achieve	that	end.	Alternatively,	they	may	not 
even	know	that	they	are	being	targeted	at	all.	Further	work	will	be	needed	if	we	are	to	fully 
understand	attitudes	toward	these	so	called	trade-offs. 
 
Areas	for	future	research 
 
● Much	of	the	current	research	is	focused	on	how	online	targeting	works	within	the	online 
advertising	industry.	There	is	a	need	for	more	research	into	attitudes	towards	other	types 
of	targeting	(such	as	in	politics,	pricing,	news	content	and	the	other	areas	described	in 
sections	1	and	2). 
● What	is	also	missing	in	the	literature	is	a	strong	sense	of	what	people,	and	particularly 
young	people,	like	about	online	targeting	and	why	they	are	more	comfortable	with	it	than 
older	people. 
● There	is	little	evidence	to	show	how	attitudes	towards	online	targeting	have	changed	over 
time,	nor	is	there	a	strong	sense	of	what	might	shape	or	drive	changes	in	those	attitudes. 
This	will	be	an	important	area	for	ongoing	research. 
● In	particular,	social	commerce,	in	which	purchasing	happens	within	social	media 
platforms,		may	be	an	area	in	which	attitudes	will	change	and	which	may	lead	to 
signiﬁcant	alterations	in	how	social	media	are	used.	Targeting	will	take	on	even	greater 
importance	if	purchasing	happens	without	leaving	a	social	media	platform. 
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4. What	are	the	harms	and	beneﬁts	of 
targeting? 
	
 
Chapter	summary 
● Online	targeting	creates	a	complex	set	of	beneﬁts	and	harms	for	companies,	individuals 
and	societies,	many	of	which	we	are	only	beginning	to	understand.	Deciding	how	to 
balance	these	involves	subjective	judgements	to	be	made,	made	on	societal	values.  
● Companies	beneﬁt	by	being	able	to	engage	and	inﬂuence	customers	more	effectively,	but 
they	risk	losing	trust	if	they	are	considered	to	be	misusing	or	mishandling	customer	data. 
● Individuals	receive	a	more	tailored	online	experience	(e.g.	content	and	advertising	that 
reﬂects	their	preferences),	but	they	lose	some	privacy	and	leave	themselves	at	risk	of 
manipulation	and	even	exploitation. 
● Wider	social	costs	and	beneﬁts	have	not	yet	been	thoroughly	explored,	but	there	are 
growing	concerns	about	targeting	leading	to	increased	polarisation	as	citizens	are 
increasingly	fed	material	that	aligns	with	their	existing	views. 
● However,	given	that	awareness	of	targeting	processes	is	far	from	universal,	and	we	do 
not	fully	understand	how	people	feel	about	online	targeting,	it	is	therefore	important	to 
avoid	overly	simplifying	ideas	around	harms,	beneﬁts	and	‘trade-offs’	around	data	usage. 
 
This	section	of	the	review	focuses	on	beneﬁts	and	harms	as	related	to	three	different	groups: 
companies	,		individuals	,	and		society	more	generally.	The	discussion	explores	how	these	groups, 
from	the	limited	information	available,	may	or	may	not	beneﬁt,	now	and	in	the	future,	as	a	result	of 
online	targeting.  
In	some	cases	a	beneﬁt	for	one	individual	or	organisation	may	be	potentially	harmful	for	others. 
For	instance,	targeting	might	produce	additional	commercial	beneﬁts	whilst	potentially	harming 
the	individual.	It	is	often	the	case	that	judgments	over	what	is	a	harm	or	a	beneﬁt	depends	on	the 
subjective	experience	and	perspectives	of	the	individual.	Also,	these	issues	may	not	always	be 
balanced.	For	example	the	beneﬁt	to	one	group	may	far	outweigh	the	potential	harms,	or 
vice-versa.	Furthermore,	individuals	may	disagree	greatly	on	whether	the	perceived	beneﬁts	(e.g.	a 
personalised	online	experience)	are	worth	the	potential	harms	(e.g.	loss	of	privacy). 
We	do	not	cover	all	possible	harms	and	beneﬁts,	but	focus	on	key	instances	within	the	literature. 
We	draw	upon	Citron	and	Pasquale’s	2014	argument	that	deﬁning	harm,	in	a	data	context,	means 
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considering	how	people,	organisations	and	social	groups	can	suffer	an	‘impairment	or	set	back’	as 
a	result	of	data-related	practices.  85
To	try	to	capture	the	range	and	interplay	of	commercial,	individual	and	social	beneﬁts	and	harms, 
the	table	below	provides	an	overview	of	the	issues: 
 
  Beneﬁts  Harms 
Companies  ● The	potential	for	increased	proﬁt 
● Widening	and	deepening	of	customer 
relationships 
● Inﬂuence	and	enhanced	marketing 
eﬃciency	(with	the	matching	of 
customers	with	products/services) 
● Readily	engaging	audiences	based	on 
their	interests  
 
● Mistrust	in	organisations 
(undermining	trust	and	leading	to 
unease	and	creepiness) 
● Fines	and	penalties 
Individual  ● Convenience 
● Discovery	of	new	media	through 
personalised	recommendations 
● Access	to	resources	and	information 
(with	masses	of	content	rendered 
manageable	and	comprehendible) 
 
 
● Loss	of	privacy 
● The	challenge	to	autonomy	(and 
the	potential	for	manipulation) 
● Exploitation	(especially	of 
vulnerable	groups)  
● Discrimination 
● Self-censorship 
 
Social  ● Possibility	for	micro-targeting	to 
enhance	voter	engagement. 
● Attention	of	those	most	affected	can 
be	drawn	to	key	social	issues	– 
possibilities	for	directed	education	and 
knowledge	sharing 
 
● Filter	bubbles	and	a	polarised 
society 
● Monopolisation	of	media 
● Collective	attention	may	be	drawn 
away	from	important	social	issues 
● Unaccountable	information 
ﬁltering,	with	potentially 
misinformed	or	narrowly	informed 
social	groups  
● The	erosion	of	solidarity 
● Individualisation	and	social 
withdrawal 
● Collapse	of	centres	of	expertise 
and	trust	(e.g.	journalism) 
● Highly	circumscribed	ﬂows	of 
knowledge	and	information 
 
85	Citron,	D.	K.,	&	Pasquale,	F.	(2014).	The	scored	society:	Due	process	for	automated	predic ons.		Wash.	L.	Rev.	,		89	,	1.	
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4.1	Companies:	Beneﬁts 
Proﬁt 
Companies	and	corporations	have	the	potential	to	make	greater	proﬁts	through	the	use	of	people’s 
data	and	information.	The	Loyalty	Report	2014	from	Bond	Brand	Loyalty	emphasised	how	personal 
information	could	be	used	to	target	customers	with	personalised	messages	and	offers,	focusing 
on	loyalty	programs. 	The	authors	state	that	these	practices	could	be	used	to	produce 86
“incremental	business	results”.	These	results	included	customers	being	three	times	more	likely	to 
spend	with	that	brand,	four	times	more	likely	to	buy	something	they	don’t	want	or	need	in	order	to 
maintain	their	loyalty	program	status	and	individuals	being	less	price-sensitive.	It	has	also	been 
suggested	that	improved	business	performance	in	these	areas	may	lead	to	higher	levels	of 
employment	and,	subsequently,	lead	to	an	indirect	beneﬁt	for	society	in	general.  87
Widening	and	deepening	of	customer	relationships 
Companies	view	online	targeting	as	a	means	to	better	identify	those	likely	to	respond	to 
advertisements	and	messages.	The	ability	to	identify	and	target	individuals	and	groups	enables 
direct	access	to	speciﬁc	markets	and	the	ability	to	match	consumers	to	products	and	services.  
The	range	of	data	collected	can	also	provide	marketers	with	a	means	to	identify	customers	they 
may	have	missed	and	so	lead	to	an	expansion	of	their	customer	base.	Better	and	more	precise 
targeting	is	credited	with	saving	organisations	money	as	they	can	focus	their	efforts.	Further, 
online	messaging	is	often	continually	tested	to	see	how	successful	it	is	and	this	learning	is	used	to 
adapt	and	reﬁne	messages.  
Inﬂuence	and	enhanced	marketing	eﬃciency 
Companies	and	other	organisations	can	beneﬁt	from	the	inﬂuence	enabled	by	online	targeting.	As 
we	have	seen,	data	collected	about	people	can	be	used	to	try	to	inﬂuence	behaviour	for	advertising, 
political	or	other	purposes. 	And	the	ability	to	inﬂuence	the	behaviour	of	customers	and	citizens	is 88
expanding	beyond	targeted	advertising	on	platforms	and	websites;	it	is	also	being	used	in	gaming, 
video	and	location	measurement	to	“nudge”	users. 	The	capability	to	inﬂuence	behaviour	through 89
targeting	can	be	used	to	satisfy	what	some	might	consider	to	be	commercially	beneﬁcial	goals, 
such	as	increased	user	“engagement”	of	a	platform	or	service. 	(This	is	returned	to	in	the	later 90
section	on	individual	harms) 
86	Bond	Brand	Loyalty.	(2014).	The	Loyalty	Report	2014.	Available	at:	
h ps://info.bondbrandloyalty.com/the-2014-loyalty-report-us	[accessed	on:	11/07/19].	
87	Furman,	J.,	Coyle,	D.,	Fletcher,	A.,	McAuley,	D.,	&	Marsden,	P.	(2019).	Unlocking	digital	compe  on.		Report	of	the	
Digital	Compe  on	Expert	Panel	.	
88	See,	for	example,	the	discussion	of	Facebook	in		Fuchs,	C.	(2017).		Social	media:	A	cri cal	introduc on	.	Sage.	
89		Chester,	J.	(2012).	Cookie	wars:	How	new	data	proﬁling	and	targe ng	techniques	threaten	ci zens	and	consumers	in	
the	“big	data”	era.	In		European	Data	Protec on:	In	Good	Health?	(pp.	53-77).	Springer,	Dordrecht	;		Gutwirth,	S.,	Leenes,	
R.,	De	Hert,	P.,	&	Poullet,	Y.	(Eds.).	(2012).		European	data	protec on:	in	good	health?	.	Springer	Science	&	Business	
Media	.	
90		Chester,	J.	(2012).	Cookie	wars:	How	new	data	proﬁling	and	targe ng	techniques	threaten	ci zens	and	consumers	in	
the	“big	data”	era.	In		European	Data	Protec on:	In	Good	Health?	.	Springer,	Dordrecht	;		Gutwirth,	S.,	Leenes,	R.,	De	
Hert,	P.,	&	Poullet,	Y.	(Eds.).	(2012).		European	data	protec on:	in	good	health?	.	Springer	Science	&	Business	Media	.	
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4.2	Companies:	Harms 
Mistrust	(creepiness) 
More	detailed	examinations	of	people’s	attitudes	to	data	collection	suggests	that	people	do	not 
necessarily	accept	data	collection	practices	but	are	resigned	to	them	because	they	are	unaware	of 
alternatives	or	feel	unable	to	challenge	them.	Further,	research	suggests	that	this	resignation 
towards	data	use	is	cultivated	by	corporate	practices.   91
As	citizens	and	consumers	ﬁnd	out	more	about	data	practices	this	may	fuel	mistrust	of 
corporations	and	political	parties	using	online	targeting. 	In	section	3	we	explored	how	online 92
targeting	can	create	problems	of	trust.	However,	as	things	stand	the	literature	does	not	fully 
explore	what	the	implications	of	a	rise	in	mistrust	associated	with	online	targeting	might	be.	Nor 
are	the	implications	of	this	mistrust	for	proﬁts,	public	image	and	recruitment	fully	understood.  93
The	‘adtech	tax’ 
Industry	representatives	have	noted	that	as	it	stands,	the	publishing	industry,	which	provides 
content	to	attract	web	visitors	and	the	space	to	sell	advertisements,	pay	a	considerable	sum	of 
their	revenue	to	the	ad-tech	intermediaries.	This	‘adtech	tax’	has	been	estimated	at	varying	rates	by 
studies	at	around	55%	of	publisher	advertising	revenue, 	although	the	Guardian	report	receiving 94
only	30%	of	what	the	organisation	selling	the	product	pays	for	the	advert, 	and	one	of	the	main 95
industry	groups	for	online	publishers,	Digital	Content	Next,	estimates	the	‘tax’	at	around	80%.  96
Targeting	technologies,	given	the	number	of	actors	they	involve,	introduce	many	more 
intermediaries	than	selling	adverts	directly,	and	this	complicates	the	notion	that	more	closely 
targeted	ads	are	more	supportive	of	quality	content	online. 
Fines	and	penalties 
Corporations	can	be	charged	ﬁnes	or	lose	market	value	as	a	result	of	their	use	of	or	involvement	in 
data	collection	and	targeting	practices.	In	2018	the	Information	Commissioner	ﬁned	Facebook 
£500,000,	the	maximum	ﬁne	possible,	for	its	failure	to	protect	personal	data. 	In	July	2018	it	was 97
reported	that	Facebook	had	lost	more	than	$100	billion	in	value	and	experienced	a	share	price	drop 
91	Draper,	N.	A.,	&	Turow,	J.	(2019).	The	corporate	cul va on	of	digital	resigna on.	New	Media	&	Society	.	
92	Turow,	J.,	Delli	Carpini,	M.	X.,	Draper,	N.	A.,	&	Howard-Williams,	R.	(2012).	Americans	roundly	reject	tailored	poli cal	
adver sing.	
93	Rodriguez,	S.	(2019)	Facebook	has	struggled	to	hire	talent	since	the	Cambridge	Analy ca	scandal,	according	to	
recruiters	who	worked	there.		CNBC	.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/facebook-has-struggled-to-recruit-since-cambridge-analy ca-scandal.html	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
94	Benes,	R.	(2018).	Why	Tech	Firms	Obtain	Most	of	the	Money	in	Programma c	Ad	Buys.		eMarketer	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.emarketer.com/content/why-tech-ﬁrms-obtain-most-of-the-money-in-programma c-purchases		[accessed	
on:	27/06/19].	
95	Pidgeon,	D.	(2016).	Where	did	the	money	go?	Guardian	buys	its	own	ad	inventory.		Mediatel	Newsline	,		4	.	
96		Digital	Content	Next.	(2019).	Brieﬁng	on	Real	Time	Bidding.	Available	at:		h ps://bit.ly/2x8vQ4Q	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
97	ICO	(2018).	ICO	issues	maximum	£500,000	ﬁne	to	Facebook	for	failing	to	protect	users’	personal	informa on.	
Available	at:	
h ps://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/10/facebook-issued-with-maximum-500-000
-ﬁne/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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of	20%	following	news	of	multiple	investigations	and	consumer	concern	following	the	Cambridge 
Analytica	scandal	and	rising	concern	and	investment	in	security.  98
4.3	Individuals:	Beneﬁts 
Convenience 
One	of	the	beneﬁts	for	individuals	is	that	online	targeting	lets	people	see	advertisements	and 
content		most	relevant	to	them. 	This	can	be	convenient	as	it	can	reduce	search-time	and	improve 99
the	eﬃciency	of	online	services. 
New	discoveries 
In	some	cases	online	targeting	has	been	found	to	provide	opportunities	for	discovering	or	ﬁnding 
content	that	was	considered	to	be	useful	or	interesting.	For	instance,	it	has	been	found	that	the 
recommendation	features	of	streaming	services	like	Spotify	have	become	an	important	part	of 
how	people	ﬁnd	out	about	music	and	inspire	further	listening. 	However,	research	conducted	in 100
Norway	has	called	into	question	the	extent	to	which	this	targeted	based	discovery	actually	impacts 
directly	on	people’s	long-term	listening	practices.   101
Access	to	resources 
It	is	also	suggested	that	data	collection	and	online	targeting	in	some	cases	can	lead	to	new 
opportunities	and	access	to	resources	for	some	people.	For	example,	a	number	of	new	start-ups, 
like	ZestFinance,	are	making	use	of	‘alternative	data’	that	includes	data	generated	through	online 
proﬁling,	to	assess	an	individual’s	credit	worthiness. 	Companies	like	ZestFinance	argue	that	the 102
use	of	alternative	data	points	mean	that	opportunities	for	loans	and	other	types	of	credit	will	be 
opened	to	groups	that	have	been	deemed	unworthy	by	conventional	credit	scoring	methods.  
4.4	Individuals:	Harms 
Loss	of	Privacy 
Online	targeting	compels	companies	to	collect	massive	data	proﬁles	on	individuals,	to	combine 
this	data	with	other	types	of	datasets	and	to	continually	develop	and	test	new	types	of	data	mining 
strategies.	The	argument	that	justiﬁes	much	of	this	behaviour	is	that	the	data	is	pseudonymised; 
however,	under	GDPR	this	means	the	information	is	still	classed	as	personal	data.	Therefore,	in 
practice	it	is	not	too	diﬃcult	for	those	in	the	know	to	re-identify	anonymised	data	by	combining 
98	Griﬃn,	A.	(2018).	Facebook	stock	price	plunge:	why	the	social	network’s	value	is	in	freefall.		Independent	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-stock-price-nasdaq-mark-zuckerberg-co
mmon-share-latest-why-explained-a8465101.html	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	It	is	speculated	that	Facebook	could	face	a	
mul -million	dollar	ﬁne	for	privacy	viola ons	as	a	result	of	a	U.S.	Federal	Trade	Commission	inves ga on	now	in	
progress.	Kang,	C.	(2019)	F.T.C.	is	said	to	be	considering	large	Facebook	ﬁnes.		The	New	York	Times	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.ny mes.com/2019/01/18/technology/facebook- c-ﬁnes.html	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
99	The	understanding	of	targe ng	as	being	part	of	the	convenience	of	various	new	and	social	media	forms	is	discussed	
in	Beer,	D.	(2019)	The	Quirks	of	Digital	Culture.		Emerald	.	
100	Johansson,	S.,	Werner,	A.,	Aker,	P.,	&	Goldenzwaig,	G.	(2018)		Streaming	Music:	Prac ces,	Media,	Cultures	.	
Routledge.	
101	Kjus,	Y.	(2016)	‘Musical	explora on	via	streaming	services:	The	Norwegian	experience’.		Popular	Communica on	,	
14(3):	127-136.		
102		Hurley,	M.,	&	Adebayo,	J.	(2017).	Credit	scoring	in	the	era	of	big	data.		Yale	Journal	of	Law	and	Technology	,	18(1),	5.	
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different	types	of	data	sets. 	Researchers	have	demonstrated	how	easy	it	can	be	to	link	data	to 103
speciﬁc	people.   104
 
The	ICO	has	noted	that	much	of	the	targeting	industry	online	are	not	compliant	with	data 
protection	legislation,	and	that	‘[i]ndividuals	have	no	guarantees	about	the	security	of	their	personal 
data	within	the	ecosystem’. 	The	targeting	infrastructure	online	is	designed	as	a	market	to 105
auction	advertising	space,	but	in	order	to	succeed	in	this	market,	players	must	know	how	much	to 
bid.	To	do	so	involves	a	process	of	‘enrichment’	using	‘data	management	platforms’,	who	take 
basic	information	about	web	browsers	and	input	and	combine	it	with	amassed	datasets	to	return 
more	detailed	information	about	that	person. 	This	market	for	enrichment	is	part	of	targeting,	and 106
structurally	involves	the	accumulation	of	large	datasets,	placing	individuals’	privacy	into	question. 
The	challenge	to	autonomy 
Attempts	to	manipulate	or	inﬂuence	behaviour	can	be	seen	to	challenge	autonomy;	algorithms	are 
increasingly	mediate	our	access	to	information	and	opportunities,	framing	our	choices	and, 
ultimately,	shape	how	we	perceive	reality.	Section	3	showed	how	discomfort	and	unease	arise 
where	autonomy	is	challenged.	Other	research	has	demonstrated	how,	in	some	circumstances, 
‘intelligent	software	agents’	can	steer	human	behaviour	and	‘undermine’	human	autonomy	and 
individual	choice.  107
Perceived	challenges	to	autonomy	also	arise	over	the	extent	to	which	these	machines	can	read	our 
minds,	infer	traits	or	shape	behaviour.	The	effectiveness	of	these	technologies	is	not	fully	known 
yet.  108
Exploitation 
The	processes	used	to	proﬁle	and	sort	people	for	the	purposes	of	targeting	are	invisible,	although 
many	people	are	now	aware	that	they	are	being	targeted	by	advertisers. 	This	can	be	seen	to	be 109
exploitative. 
People	are	also	not	often	aware	of	how	data	is	used	to	identify	and	exploit	our	vulnerabilities. 	For 110
instance,	a	U.S.	Senate	Investigation	found	data	brokers	selling	lists	that	focused	on	ﬁnancial 
103	Ohm,	P.	(2009).	Broken	promises	of	privacy:	Responding	to	the	surprising	failure	of	anonymiza on.		UCLA	l.	Rev.	,		57	,	
1701.	
104		Hallinan,	B.,	&	Striphas,	T.	(2016).	Recommended	for	you:	The	Ne lix	Prize	and	the	produc on	of	algorithmic	
culture.		New	media	&	society	,		18	(1),	117-137	;		Solove,	D.	J.,	&	Citron,	D.	K.	(2017).	Risk	and	Anxiety:	A	Theory	of	
Data-Breach	Harms.		Tex.	L.	Rev.	,		96	,	737.	
105		ICO	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding.	
106		ICO	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding.	
107	Burr,	C.,	Cris anini,	N.,	&	Ladyman,	J.	(2018).	An	Analysis	of	the	Interac on	Between	Intelligent	So ware	Agents	and	
Human	Users.		Minds	and	Machines	,		28	(4),	735-774.	
108		Burr,	C.,	&	Cris anini,	N.	(2019).	Can	Machines	Read	our	Minds?.		Minds	and	Machines	,	1-34.	These	ques ons	of	
machine-based	inference	of	thinking	are	also	covered	in	various	popular	outlets,	such	as	in	Harris,	T.	(2016).	How	
technology	is	hijacking	your	mind.		Thrive	Global	,	available	at:	
h ps://medium.com/thrive-global/how-technology-hijacks-peoples-minds-from-a-magician-and-google-s-design-ethic
ist-56d62ef5edf3	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
109		Hurley,	M.,	&	Adebayo,	J.	(2017).	Credit	scoring	in	the	era	of	big	data.		Yale	Journal	of	Law	and	Technology	,		18	(1),	5.	
110		Dixon,	P.	(2013).	Congressional	tes mony:	what	informa on	do	data	brokers	have	on	consumers?.	In		World	Privacy	
Forum	.	
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vulnerability. 	Gangadharan	has	detailed	how	some	in	the	subprime	industry	of	the	1990s	and 111
2000s	used	online	targeting	to	market	subprime	mortgages	and	loans	to	those	on	low-income	or 
with	low	credit.	Predatory	lending	was	not	just	related	to	income,	it	has	also	been	shown	that 
lenders	in	some	cases	use	racial	proﬁling	for	loans	and	mortgages. 	Previous	research	has 112
demonstrated	that	those	with	low-incomes	are	particularly	vulnerable	when	it	comes	to	data 
collection	and	targeting	because	they	are	less	likely	to	take	steps	to	protect	their	privacy	when 
online	or	when	using	their	mobile	phones.   113
Children	are	another	vulnerable	group	potentially	at	risk	of	targeting	methods.	Google	is	facing 
increasing	criticism	for	the	way	that	the	company	is	collecting,	sharing	and	using	children’s	data, 
including	location	data,	for	targeting	and	advertising.	Much	of	the	criticism	relates	to	YouTube,	a 
subsidiary	of	Google.	In	the	United	States	politicians	and	consumer	advocacy	groups	are	arguing 
that	the	company	is	violating	the	Children’s	Online	Privacy	Protection	Act.   114
It	has	also	been	suggested	that	the	design	of	YouTube’s	algorithm	might	be	exploiting	children.	It 
has	been	designed	to	maximise	user	engagement	by	recommending	sensational	and	extreme 
content,	to	keep	people	watching. 	This	could	be	problematic	for	children	who	may	not	be	aware 115
of	the	targeting	strategies	being	employed	and	who	may	be	inﬂuenced	or	harmed	by	increasingly 
sensational	content. 	There	is	little	research	on	this. 116
Discrimination 
The	data	obtained	to	facilitate	online	targeting	of	advertisements	is	also	being	used	to	score 
individuals	in	ways	that	can	affect	access	to	essentials	like	insurance	and	housing.	Credit	rating 
companies,	insurance	companies,	housing	providers	and	employers	make	use	of	‘alternative	data’ 
as	part	of	their	automated	scoring	systems. 	Research	has	raised	concerns	about	how 117
algorithmic	scoring	could	lead	to	both	unintentional	and	intentional	discrimination,	whilst	also 
being	nearly	impossible	for	individuals	to	identify,	interrogate	or	challenge.	For	instance,	Sandra 
Wachter	has	explored	how	‘aﬃnity	proﬁling’—which	targets	based	on	‘assumed	interests’	and	not 
just	‘personal	traits’—an	be	used	to	‘infer	very	sensitive	information	(e.g.	ethnicity,	gender,	sexual 
orientation,	religious	beliefs)	about	individuals	to	target	or	exclude	certain	groups’. 	This	suggests 118
that	inferences	and	associations	may	feed	into	potential	discriminatory	processes	in	online 
111	Oﬃce	of	Oversight	and	Inves ga ons	Majority	Staﬀ.	(2013).	A	Review	of	the	Data	Broker		
Industry:	Collec on,	Use,	and	Sale	of	Consumer	Data	for	Marke ng	Purposes.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/ﬁles/0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577/AE5D72CBE7F44F5
BFC846BECE22C875B.12.18.13-senate-commerce-commi ee-report-on-data-broker-industry.pdf		[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
112		Gangadharan,	S.	P.	(2012).	Digital	inclusion	and	data	proﬁling.		First	Monday	,		17	(5).	
113		Madden,	M.,	Gilman,	M.,	Levy,	K.,	&	Marwick,	A.	(2017).	Privacy,	poverty,	and	Big	Data:	A	matrix	of	vulnerabili es	
for	poor	Americans.		Wash.	UL	Rev.	,		95	,	53	.		
114	Maheshwari,	S.	(2018).	New	pressure	on	Google	and	YouTube	over	children’s	data.		The	New	York	Times	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.ny mes.com/2018/09/20/business/media/google-youtube-children-data.html	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
115	Neudert,	L.	M.,	&	Marchal,	N.	(2019)	Polarisa on	and	the	use	of	technology	in	poli cal	campaigns	and	
communica on.		European	Parliament	.	
116	Orphanides,	K.G.	(2018).	Children’s	YouTube	is	s ll	churning	out	blood,	suicide	and	cannibalism.		Wired	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.wired.co.uk/ar cle/youtube-for-kids-videos-problems-algorithm-recommend	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
117	Citron,	D.	K.,	&	Pasquale,	F.	(2014).	The	scored	society:	due	process	for	automated		
Predic ons.		Washington	Law	Review	,	89:	1-33.	
118	Wachter,	S.	(2019).	Aﬃnity	Proﬁling	and	Discrimina on	by	Associa on	in	Online	Behavioural	Adver sing.		Available	
at	SSRN	.	
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targeting.	The	ICO	has	also	expressed	concerns	that	the	inference	of	these	‘special	categories’	of 
data	is	in	violation	of	data	protection	law.  119
Discriminatory	practices	through	online	targeting	can	be	both	intentional	and	unintentional. 
Crawford	and	Shultz	detail	how	uses	of	data	can	allow	people	or	organisations	who	want	to 
discriminate	to	do	so	by	‘isolating	correlative	attributes	that	they	can	use	as	a	proxy	for	traits	such 
as	race	and	gender’. 	In	one	case	ProPublica	found	evidence	that	ZIP	codes	with	large	Asian 120
populations	were	being	offered	more	expensive	tutoring	packages	by	the	Princeton	Review	than 
those	in	other	ZIP	codes. 	Alongside	this,	Ali	et	al	have	found	that	even	with	open	or	‘inclusive’ 121
targeting	parameters	being	set	the	ad	delivery	on	Facebook	can	still	end	up	being	unintentionally 
skewed	across	racial	and	gender	lines	by,	for	example,	making	it	more	expensive	to	target	adverts 
at	potential	female	job	candidates.  122
A		Wall	Street	Journal		investigation	found	other	companies	varying	the	prices	of	products	online 
based	on	data	collected	about	users. 	Saﬁya	Noble’s	work	demonstrates	how	search	engines	can 123
reinforce	racism.	For	example	entering	the	phrase	“black	girls”,	returned	results	with	pornographic 
links. 	Noble’s	work	draws	attention	to	how	algorithmic	bias	is	part	of	longstanding	stereotypical 124
representations	and	highlights	how	new	digital	tools	can	reinforce	such	representations. 
A	range	of	techniques	have	been	proposed	to	avoid	indirect	discrimination	in	predictive	systems 
such	as	those	used	in	advertising,	however	they	come	with	a	core	caveat:	to	analyse	whether 
systems	are	being	discriminatory	relies	on	the	use	of	sensitive	personal	data	to	make	such	an 
assessment. 	For	a	public	sector	organisation	or	an	employer,	this	might	be	carried	out	through 125
an	equality	of	opportunity	form,	however	online	it	would	require	the	infrastructure	to	collect	this 
data	to	be	built,	and	sensitive	data	to	be	transferred.	This	creates	further	privacy	and 
discrimination	risks	given	that,	as	the	ICO	has	noted,	there	are	‘no	guarantees	about	the	security	of 
their	personal	data	within	the	[targeting]	ecosystem’. 	Researchers	at	the	Alan	Turing	Institute 126
among	others	have	proposed	using	cryptographic	approaches	to	solve	this	problem	in	areas	such 
as	online	targeting,	but	further	work	is	required	to	make	this	a	reality.  127
119		ICO	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding;	ICO	(2018).	Democracy	Disrupted?	Personal	
informa on	and	poli cal	inﬂuence.	
120	Crawford,	K.,	&	Schultz,	J.	(2014).	Big	data	and	due	process:	Toward	a	framework	to	redress	predic ve	privacy	
harms.		BCL	Rev.	,		55	,	93.	
121		Angwin,	J.,	&	Larson,	J.	(2015).	The	 ger	mom	tax:	Asians	are	nearly	twice	as	likely	to	get	a	higher	price	from	
Princeton	review.		Also	see		Angwin,	J.,	&	Parris	Jr,	T.	(2016).	Facebook	lets	adver sers	exclude	users	by	race.		ProPublica	
blog	,		28	.	
122	Ali,	M.,	Sapiezynski,	P.,	Bogen,	M.,	Korolova,	A.,	Mislove,	A.,	&	Rieke,	A.	(2019).	Discrimina on	through	op miza on:	
How	Facebook's	ad	delivery	can	lead	to	skewed	outcomes.		arXiv	preprint	arXiv:1904.02095	.	
123		Valen no-Devries,	J.,	Singer-Vine,	J.,	&	Soltani,	A.	(2012).	Websites	vary	prices,	deals	based	on	users’	informa on.	
The	Wall	Street	Journal	,		10	,	60-68	.	Other	researchers,	who	studied	Google	ads,	found	that	men	were	being	shown	ads	
for	higher	paying	jobs	more	o en	than	women—see		Da a,	A.,	Tschantz,	M.	C.,	&	Da a,	A.	(2015).	Automated	
experiments	on	ad	privacy	se ngs.		Proceedings	on	privacy	enhancing	technologies	,		2015	(1),	92-112.	
124	Noble,	S.	U.	(2018).		Algorithms	of	oppression:	How	search	engines	reinforce	racism	.	NYU	Press.	
125	Veale,	M.,	&	Binns,	R.	(2017).	Fairer	machine	learning	in	the	real	world:	Mi ga ng	discrimina on	without	collec ng	
sensi ve	data.		Big	Data	&	Society	,		4	(2),	2053951717743530.	
126	ICO.	(2019).	Update	report	into	adtech	and	real	 me	bidding.		
127		Kilbertus,	N.,	Gascon,	A.,	Kusner,	M.,	Veale,	M.,	Gummadi,	K.	P.,	&	Weller,	A.	(2018).	Blind	Jus ce:	Fairness	with	
Encrypted	Sensi ve	A ributes.		In	J.	Dy	&	A.	Krause	(Eds.),	Proceedings	of	the	35th	Interna onal	Conference	on	Machine	
Learning	.	
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Self-censorship 
There	is	a	danger	that	knowledge	of	corporate	and	government	surveillance	practices	will	lead 
people	to	self-censor—a	phenomenon	sometimes	described	as	the	‘chilling	effect’. 	Indeed,	this 128
need	only	be	a		perceived	lack	of	privacy,	rather	than	an	actual	one,	before	it	can	lead	to	changes	in 
behaviour,		and	discourage	users	from	engaging	with	platforms	for	fear	of	an	invasion	to	their 
privacy.	Previous	research	has	found	that	people	are	likely	to	be	more	careful	or	self-censor	online, 
when	they	know	they	are	being	watched. 	If	people	think	they	are	being	tracked	they	may	worry 129
about	how	data	collected	about	their	online	activity	could	be	used	against	them. 	As	Dobber	et	al. 130
argue,	this	becomes	particularly	important	when	related	to	politics. 	They	suggest	it	could 131
potentially	hamper	an	individual's	ability	to	reach	an	informed	decision,	which	is	a	cornerstone	of 
liberal	democratic	political	systems.  132
4.5	Society:	Beneﬁts 
There	is	a	signiﬁcant	lack	of	research	on	the	beneﬁts	of	online	targeting	for	society.	Research	has 
tended	to	focus	on	social	harms.	If	there	are	social	beneﬁts,	then	future	work	will	be	needed	to 
highlight	exactly	where	these	may	arise.	There	are	potential	social	beneﬁts	in	terms	of	the	way	that 
mass	attention	can	be	drawn	to	important	social	issues	(such	as	climate	change,	for	instance),	the 
potential	implicit	beneﬁts	of	an	eﬃcient	consumer	capitalism	and	the	opportunities	it	presents	for 
expanding	technology	and	marketing	sectors.	However	these	are	yet	to	be	systematically	explored 
or	researched	thoroughly.  
An	example	of	a	potentially	positive	social	application	of	online	targeting	can	be	seen	with	the 
Facebook	voter	turnout	study	which	demonstrated	that	targeted	messaging	on	social	media	could 
be	used	to	increase	voter	engagement.	This	might	be	considered	a	beneﬁt,	provided	there	was	an 
ability	to	ensure	this	was	not	being	used	in	a	way	that	favours	one	party	over	another.	The	research 
suggests	that	micro-targeting	could	also	be	used	to	enhance	voter	engagement	by	connecting 
voters	to	the	issues	that	matter	to	them.  133
4.6	Society:	Harms 
Filter	bubbles	and	a	polarized	society 
Concern	is	being	raised	about	how	internet	platforms	may	be	limiting	public	debate	by	narrowing 
and	personalizing	information. 	The	concern	is	that	as	algorithms	tailor	a	person’s	Facebook 134
news	feed	or	search	engine	results	based	on	a	perceived	proﬁle,	an	individual	becomes	part	of	a 
128	Mavriki,	P.,	&	Karyda,	M.	(2017,	December).	Using	Personaliza on	Technologies	for	Poli cal	Purposes:	Privacy	
Implica ons.	In		Interna onal	Conference	on	e-Democracy	.	Springer,	Cham.	
129	McDonald,	A.,	&	Cranor,	L.	F.	(2010,	August).	Beliefs	and	behaviors:	Internet	users'	understanding	of	behavioral	
adver sing.	
130	Dobber,	T.,	Trilling,	D.,	Helberger,	N.,	&	de	Vreese,	C.	(2018).	Spiraling	downward:	The	reciprocal	rela on	between	
a tude	toward	poli cal	behavioral	targe ng	and	privacy	concerns.		New	Media	&	Society	.	
131	Reiman,	J.	H.	(2017).	Driving	to	the	panop con:	A	philosophical	explora on	of	the	risks	to	privacy	posed	by	the	
highway	technology	of	the	future.	In		Privacy	.	Routledge.	
132	Dobber,	T.,	Trilling,	D.,	Helberger,	N.,	&	de	Vreese,	C.	(2018).	Spiraling	downward:	The	reciprocal	rela on	between	
a tude	toward	poli cal	behavioral	targe ng	and	privacy	concerns.		New	Media	&	Society	.	
133	Woolley,	S.	C.,	&	Howard,	P.	N.	(Eds.).	(2018).		Computa onal	propaganda:	poli cal	par es,	poli cians,	and	poli cal	
manipula on	on	social	media	.	Oxford	University	Press.	
134	Connolly,	K.	(2016).	Angela	Merkel:	internet	search	engines	are	“distor ng	percep on”.		The	Guardian	,		27	.	
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“ﬁlter	bubble”	or	“echo	chamber.”	In	this	environment,	individuals	may	only	see	information	and 
opinions	that	mirror	their	own,	which	can	harden	opinions	and	prevent	people	from	experiencing 
narratives	and	ideas	that	run	counter	to	their	own.  
However	there	is	currently	considerable	debate	about	the	extent	to	which	the	echo	chamber	effect 
of	social	media	is	as	extreme	as	it	has	been	made	out	to	be.	Some	research	suggests	social 
media,	in	comparison	to	traditional	news	sources,	has	generally	increased	the	range	of	sources 
that	people	gain	their	information	from.  135
Unaccountable	information	ﬁltering 
Another	danger,	which	affects	individuals	as	much	as	groups,	lies	in	the	potential	for	important 
information	to	be	entirely	ﬁltered	out	of	public	awareness	and	discourse.	Tufekci	argues	that	the 
latter	was	the	case	when	teenager	Michael	Brown	was	killed	by	police	in	Ferguson	in	2014.	Initially 
the	killing,	vigils	and	protests	went	uncovered	by	the	media	and	did	not	appear	in	many	Facebook 
news	feeds.	Tufekci	argues	that	this	happened	because	the	story	was	not	algorithmically	meeting 
Facebook’s	‘criteria	for	relevance.’ 	In	contrast,	Twitter	feeds	at	that	time	were	not	algorithmically 136
determined	and	content	regarding	Ferguson	was	shared	and	ampliﬁed	by	Twitter	users.	As	more 
people	shared	reports	of	what	was	happening	in	Ferguson,	public	and	media	attention	increased. 
Tufekci	argues	that	sustained	protests	and	Twitter	activity	eventually	forced	the	issue	on	to	the 
national	media	agenda.  
Given	the	importance	of	social	media	to	political	movements	and	debate	it	is	crucial	to	pay 
attention	to	how	algorithms	might	inﬂuence	the	political	arena.	If	algorithms	are	being	used	with 
the	intention	of	personalizing	and	targeting	content,	it	may	have	a	side	effect	of	silencing	or 
rendering	invisible	certain	kinds	of	information.	Concerns	about	information	ﬁltering	and	how	it 
may	damage	social	and	political	life	are	compounded	by	the	monopolization	of	online	markets.   137
Monopolisation	of	media 
The	dominance	of	a	few	platforms	and	the	increasing	use	of	social	media	to	access	news	is 
leading	to	ﬁnancial	loss	for	smaller	providers	as	well	as	content	producers.	This	is	having	a 
particular	impact	on	mainstream	news	providers. 	As	advertisers	move	from	mainstream	media 138
135	Neudert,	L.	M.,	&	Marchal,	N.	(2019).	Polarisa on	and	the	use	of	technology	in	poli cal	campaigns	and	
communica on.		European	Parliament	,	available	at:	
h p://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/634414/EPRS_STU(2019)634414_EN.pdf	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19];	Bruns,	A.	(2016).	Echo	chamber?	What	echo	chamber?		The	Conversa on	,	available	at:	
h ps://theconversa on.com/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber-69293	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	Dubois,	E.,	&	Blank,	
G.	(2017).	The	echo	chamber	is	overstated:	the	modera ng	eﬀect	of	poli cal	interest	and	diverse	media.		Informa on,	
Communica on	&	Society	,	21(5);	Möller,	J.,	Trilling,	D.,	Helberger,	N.,	&	Es,	B.	van.	(2018).	Do	not	blame	it	on	the	
algorithm:	An	empirical	assessment	of	mul ple	recommender	systems	and	their	impact	on	content	diversity.	
Informa on,	Communica on	&	Society	,	21(7),	959–977.	
136	Tufekci,	Z.	(2016).	Algorithmic	Harms	Beyond	Facebook	and	Google:	Emergent	Challenges	of	Computa onal	Agency.	
J.on	Telecomm	&	High	Tech.	L.,		13,	203-217.	
137	Haucap,	J.,	&	Heimeshoﬀ,	U.	(2014).	Google,	Facebook,	Amazon,	eBay:	Is	the	Internet	driving	compe  on	or	market	
monopoliza on?.		Interna onal	Economics	and	Economic	Policy	,		11	(1-2),	49-61.	
138	The	coverage	of	this	impact	has	been	wide-ranging	and	includes	Seney,	M.	(2015).	Newspapers	face	up	to	the	add	
crunch	in	print	and	digital.		Guardian	.	For	academic	research	on	the	role	of	social	media	in	the	consump on	of	news	
sources	see	Myllylah ,	M.	(2018).	An	a en on	economy	trap?	An	empirical	inves ga on	into	four	companies’	
Facebook	traﬃc	and	social	media	revenue.		Journal	of	Media	Business	Studies	,	15(4),	237-253.		And	for	a	comparison	of	
the	impact	of	social	media	on	newspapers	see		Sparks,	C.,	Wang,	H.,	Huang,	Y.,	Zhao,	Y.,	Lü,	N.,	&	Wang,	D.	(2016).	The	
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organizations	to	online	platforms,	newsroom	staff	around	the	world	have	been	cut	which	in	turn 
affects	content	and	the	ability	of	newsrooms	to	investigate	and	cover	changes	and	events.	These 
and	other	changes	to	digital	media	have	created	new	questions	for	competition	policy,	as	noted	in 
the	recent	report	of	the	Government’s	Digital	Competition	Expert	Panel. 	These	processes	are 139
most	likely	impacting	other	sectors	as	well,	though	more	research	is	needed	to	conﬁrm	this. 
The	erosion	of	solidarity 
Online	targeting	is	being	used	for	political	campaigning	and	other	socially	sensitive	purposes,	in 
some	cases	to	spread	disinformation	and	to	share	‘dark’	posts	(see	above). 	As,	for	example, 140
targeted	political	campaigns	are	designed	to	focus	on	speciﬁc	groups	of	people,	it	prevents	other 
groups	from	seeing,	understanding	or	challenging	the	views	of	their	opponents. 	This	potentially 141
undermines	a	key	feature	of	a	democracy—open	and	free	political	debate.  142
There	is	limited	research	on	whether	or	not	such	direct	ads	work	when	it	comes	to	voting. 
Research	by	the	Online	Privacy	Foundation,	which	tested	the	eﬃcacy	of	psychographic	marketing 
in	political	campaigns,	suggests	that	these	strategies	can	be	effective. 	More	research	is	needed 143
to	determine	how	accurate	these	proﬁles	are	and	how	effective	personalised	targeting	can	be.  144
Regardless	of	their	eﬃcacy,	an	enduring	concern	is	that	these	adverts	go	unseen	by	many	and	are 
currently	operating	outside	of	rules	governing	political	campaigns. 	This	has	led	to	attempts	to 145
use	social	media	to	manipulate	elections.	For	example,	Facebook	has	admitted	that	during	the 
2016	American	election	3,000	ads	linked	to	470	Facebook	accounts	were	purchased	by	groups 
linked	to	the	Russian	state. 	Facebook	said	that	the	ads	were	focused	on	divisive	social	and 146
political	issues	and	targeted	speciﬁc	‘categories’	of	people. 	Google	and	Twitter	have	also 147
testiﬁed	that	ads	were	purchased	by	Russian	operations. 	Research	into	dark	advertising	has 148
found	that	voters	in	some	regions	and	demographics	were	targeted	more	than	others	with	tailored 
impact	of	digital	media	on	newspapers:	Comparing	responses	in	China	and	the	United	States.		Global	Media	and	China	,	
1	(3),	186-207.	
139	Digital	Compe  on	Expert	Panel.	(2019).	Unlocking	Digital	Compe  on:	Report	of	the	Digital	Compe  on	Expert	
Panel.	available	at:	
h ps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/a achment_data/ﬁle/785547/unlockin
g_digital_compe  on_furman_review_web.pdf		[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
140		Mavriki,	P.,	&	Karyda,	M.	(2017,	December).	Using	Personaliza on	Technologies	for	Poli cal	Purposes:	Privacy	
Implica ons.	In		Interna onal	Conference	on	e-Democracy	(pp.	33-46).	Springer,	Cham.	
141	Zuiderveen	Borgesius,	F.,	Möller,	J.,	Kruikemeier,	S.,	Ó	Fathaigh,	R.,	Irion,	K.,	Dobber,	T.,	...	&	de	Vreese,	C.	H.	(2018).	
Online	poli cal	microtarge ng:	Promises	and	threats	for	democracy.		Utrecht	Law	Review	,		14	(1),	82-96.	
142	For	a	discussion	see		Bartle ,	J.	(2018).		The	People	Vs	Tech:	How	the	internet	is	killing	democracy	(and	how	we	save	
it)	.	Random	House.	
143	Sumner,	C.	(2017).	Exploring	the	eﬃcacy	of	psychographic	marke ng	in	poli cal	campaigns.		Online	Privacy	
Founda on	,	available	at:		h ps://www.onlineprivacyfounda on.org/opf-research/psychographic-targe ng/	[accessed	
on:	27/06/19].	
144	Whi lestone,	J.,	Nyrup,	R.,	Alexandrova,	A.,	Dihal,	K.,	&	Cave,	S.	(2019).	Ethical	and	societal	implica ons	of	
algorithms,	data,	and	ar ﬁcial	intelligence:	a	roadmap	for	research.		London:	Nuﬃeld	Founda on	.	
145		Tambini,	D.	(2017).	Fake	News:	Public	Policy	Responses.	Media	Policy	Brief	20.	London:	Media	Policy	Project,	London	
School	of	Economics	and	Poli cal	Science.	
146	Stamos,	A.	(2017).	An	update	on	informa on	opera ons	on	Facebook.		Facebook	Newsroom	,		6	.	
147	Kim,	Y.	M.,	Hsu,	J.,	Neiman,	D.,	Kou,	C.,	Bankston,	L.,	Kim,	S.	Y.,	...	&	Rasku ,	G.	(2018).	The	stealth	media?	Groups	
and	targets	behind	divisive	issue	campaigns	on	Facebook.		Poli cal	Communica on	,		35	(4),	515-541.	
148	Kim,	Y.	M.,	Hsu,	J.,	Neiman,	D.,	Kou,	C.,	Bankston,	L.,	Kim,	S.	Y.,	...	&	Rasku ,	G.	(2018).	The	stealth	media?	Groups	
and	targets	behind	divisive	issue	campaigns	on	Facebook.		Poli cal	Communica on	,		35	(4),	515-541.	
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content. 	The	issue	here	is	clearly	one	of	the	diﬃculties	this	creates	for	accountability	where	the 149
source	and	delivery	of	targeted	content	cannot	be	traced. 
Areas	for	future	research 
 
● Future	research	into	the	harms	and	beneﬁts	of	online	targeting	will	need	to	be	attentive	to 
the	way	that	certain	forms	of	targeting	may	create	combinations	of	harms	and	beneﬁts 
across	different	stakeholders	and	in	different	contexts.  
● Research	on	harms	and	beneﬁts	should	move	beyond	privacy	and	personalisation	.		There 
has	been	a	lack	of	attention	to	documenting	the	varying	experiences	of	beneﬁts	and 
harms	that	result	from	online	targeting	and	related	practices. 
● Relatively	little	is	known	of	whether	the	harms	and	beneﬁts	of	online	targeting	apply	in 
the	same	way	when	deployed	by	public	sector	organisations. 	It	is	notable	that	the 150
literature	highlights	very	few	social	beneﬁts	of	online	targeting	beyond	the	commercial 
gains	that	it	facilitates.	This	could	be	a	growing	area	of	interest	as	some	governments 
begin	exploring	how	such	strategies	could	enhance	citizen	response	and	compliance. 
More	research	is	needed	to	identify	civil	society	applications. 
● Little	is	known	about	the	impact	of	targeting	on	children	and	other	vulnerable	groups	or 
their	experiences	of	targeting.	This	may	be	targeting	with	harmful	content	or	the	routine 
targeting	of	recommendations	that	might	then	shape	learning,	knowledge	and 
understanding	of	social	issues	and	self-identity. 
● It	could	be	important	to	research	how	decisive	targeting	techniques	are	in	shaping	or 
changing	political	preferences	and	voting	behaviour.	It	will	be	a	diﬃcult	area	to	assess,	as 
the	data	largely	sits	within	major	private	technology	companies	and	platforms.	Although 
some	are	beginning	to	open	up	their	current	activities	to	scrutiny	by	external	researchers, 
in	at	least	some	cases	they	appear	unwilling	to	treat	historic	activities	in	the	same	way.  151
● Where	they	provide	new	opportunities	for	online	targeting,	more	research	is	needed	into 
the	use	of	and	potential	harms	and	beneﬁts	associated	with	facial	recognition	and 
emotion	sensing	technologies	(which	could	include,	for	example,	smart	speakers	and 
other	smart	home	devices). 
149	Kim,	Y.	M.,	Hsu,	J.,	Neiman,	D.,	Kou,	C.,	Bankston,	L.,	Kim,	S.	Y.,	...	&	Rasku ,	G.	(2018).	The	stealth	media?	Groups	
and	targets	behind	divisive	issue	campaigns	on	Facebook.		Poli cal	Communica on	,		35	(4),	515-541.	
150	Kennedy,	H.	(2016).		Post,	mine,	repeat:	Social	media	data	mining	becomes	ordinary	.	Springer.	
151	Ingram,	D.	(2018).	Facebook	opens	up	to	researchers—but	not	about	2016	elec on.		NBC	News	.	
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5. How	might	harms	be	minimised	and 
beneﬁts	facilitated	over	the	short	and 
longer	terms? 
 
 
Chapter	summary 
● Effective	action	on	online	targeting	will	require	consideration	of	regulation	and	further 
regulatory	action,	but	other	measures	will	also	be	needed. 
● New	forms	of	public	education	and	awareness-raising	need	to	be	in	the	foreground	of	any 
‘data	ethics’	programmes. 
● It	would	be	beneﬁcial	to	seek	to	expand	current	‘data	ethics’	priorities	on	personal	data 
privacy	and	data	protection,	and	to	use	this	to	emphasize	the	collective	beneﬁts	of 
enhanced	data	rights,	fairness,	solidarity,	citizenship,	autonomy,	and	dignity	(a	social 
model	of	data	ethics).  
● Data	trusts	could	be	established	to	ensure	and	observe	the	ethical,	legal	and	fair	use	of 
data	in	online	targeting. 
● Technological	solutions	available	to	individual	users	can	provide	additional	transparency 
and	block	some	targeting,	but	are	unlikely	to	provide	a	robust	and	comprehensive 
solution	to	potential	harms. 
 
This	section	summarizes	key	literature	and	speciﬁc	projects	designed	to	address	the	governance 
of	online	targeting	by	minimising	harms	and	facilitating	beneﬁts.  
5.1.	Data	governance 
Data	governance	broadly	refers	to	how	data	is	managed,	regulated,	and	controlled.	Online	targeting 
raises	challenges	related	to	data	governance,	including	consent,	data	rights	and	data	justice, 
privacy,	and	human	self-determination.  152
 
152	Ques ons	of	data	ownership	have	moved	more	towards	data	rights.	See	‘Data	ownership,	rights	and	controls:	
reaching	a	common	understanding’,	Discussions	at	a	Bri sh	Academy,	Royal	Society	and	techUK	seminar	on	3	October	
2018,	available	at:	
h ps://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/data-governance/data-ownership-rights-and-controls-October-2018.
pdf		[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	See	also		Taddeo,	M.,	&	Floridi,	L.	(2018).	How	AI	can	be	a	force	for	good.		Science	,	
361	(6404),	751-752.	
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The	EU’s	new	data	governance	framework 
The	European	Union’s	science	and	knowledge	service,	the	Joint	Research	Centre,	has	begun	to 
create	a	new	data	governance	framework	for	‘a	digitally	transformed	European	society’.	It	is	a 
progressive	agenda	based	on	three	key	strands: 
● Citizen	focused	:	It	explicitly	addresses	citizens’	needs,	and	not	only	market	demand 
● Citizen	empowered	:	Citizens	are	seen	as	important	and	relevant	actors.	Consequently	focus 
is	on	giving	them	control	of	their	personal	information	or	letting	them	participate	and 
collect	data	to	use	for	policy	making 
● Data	for	public	value	:	Places	an	emphasis	on	using	data	to	produce	public	value.  153
A	core	theme	of	the	report	is	how	to	govern	data.	However	it	is	also	concerned	with	how	to	use 
data	for	governing	effectively.	For	example,	it	hints	at	some	potential	beneﬁts	such	as 
‘personalised	policies’	deployed	through	systems	similar	to	those	currently	used	for	marketing	and 
advertising.  
The	report	is	sensitive	to	both	the	‘extreme	data	commercialization’	of	platform	capitalism	and	the 
‘extreme	governmental	control’	of	citizens’	personal	data	exempliﬁed	by	recent	trends	in	China.	It 
recognizes	that	while	individual	proﬁling	and	targeting	is	controversial,	a	new	European	digital 
platform	could	be	developed	for	opinion	sharing,	authoring	content,	identity	management	and 
voting.	However	such	a	platform	would	have	to	be	designed	to	support		strong	ethical	frameworks 
and	EU	values,	such	as	adhering	to	privacy	by	design,	fostering	data	literacy,	and	granting	citizens 
data	rights. 
Other	European	examples	of	programmes	concerned	with	data	governance	include: 
 
● The	Milano	GeoPortal:	an	open	data	repository	for	urban	information	allows	citizens 
real-time	access	to	key	city	data,	and	enables	administrative	tasks	to	be	optimized.  154
● The	DECODE	project:	a	major	EU	research	consortium	working	with	the	cities	of	Amsterdam 
and	Barcelona	which	responds	to	concerns	that	citizens	have	lost	control	of	their	personal 
data	to	corporate	monopolies.	The	principal	UK	partner	is	the	innovation	charity	Nesta. 
Through	the	use	of	open	data,	privacy-by-design	strategies,	citizen-centred	platforms, 
anonymised	authentication	tools,	and	decentralized	technology	models	(e.g.	Blockchain), 
DECODE	is	attempting	to	build	a	data-centric	digital	economy	focused	on	public	value.  155
These	initiatives	demonstrate	commitment	at	a	high	level	in	the	EU	to	both	strong	data	governance 
and	‘good	data’	use	that	is	in	the	public	beneﬁt.	However,	in	a	wider	sense	governance	can	also 
encompass	the	internal	culture	and	standard	practices	within	a	company,	and	need	not	be	limited 
to	laws	and	regulations.	Therefore,	some	of	the	issues	raised	within	this	report	may	be,	at	least	in 
part,	tackled	through	changes	in	the	internal	culture	and	practices	of	companies	which	handle 
personal	data. 
 
153	Micheli,	M.,	Blakemore,	M.,	Pon ,	M.,	&	Craglia,	M.	(2018).	The	Governance	of	Data	in	a	Digitally	Transformed	
European	Society.	
154	Milano	Geoportal,	available	at:		h ps://geoportale.comune.milano.it/sit/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
155	DECODE	project,	available	at:		h ps://decodeproject.eu/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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5.2.	Regulation	and	law 
Regulation	and	legal	instruments	are	evolving	very	quickly	to	respond	to	online	targeting, 
personalisation	and	mass	predictive	analytics.	Three	key	areas	are	currently	on	the	political 
agenda:		regulation	of	online	harms	,		enforcement	of	GDPR	and		anti-trust/competition	law.  
Regulating	online	harms 
UK	Online	Harms	White	Paper 
Targeting	might	cause	online	harm	by	breaching	privacy	but	also	by	persuasively	monopolising 
users’	attention	to	maximise	time	spent	on	the	platform.	Many	of	the	risks	and	challenges	for	law 
and	regulation	have	been	extensively	documented	in	the	Ofcom	report	‘	Addressing	Harmful	Online 
Content	’, 	the	TechUK	report	‘	Tackling	Online	Harm	’ 	and	in	a	recently	released	DCMS	White 156 157
Paper	on	Online	Harms. 	The	Online	Harms	White	Paper	outlines	the	Government’s	plans	for 158
online	safety	measures	that	are	also	intended	to	support	innovation	and	boost	the	digital	economy. 
It	details	legislative	and	non-legislative	measures	which	are	aimed	at	making	companies	more 
responsible	for	their	users’	safety	online,	with	particular	focus	on	children	and	other	vulnerable 
groups. 
The	White	Paper	proposes	establishing	in	law	a	new	duty	of	care	towards	users,	which	will	be 
overseen	by	an	independent	regulator.	Companies	will	be	held	to	account	for	tackling	a 
comprehensive	set	of	online	harms,	ranging	from	illegal	activity	and	content	to	behaviours	which 
are	harmful	but	not	necessarily	illegal.	However,	while	targeting	constitutes	a	potential	risk	of 
harm,	it	does	not	feature	signiﬁcantly	in	either	of	these	documents,	raising	the	need	for	greater 
regulatory	and	legal	clarity	over	the	evidence	for	targeting	harms.  
Regulation	of	recommendation	systems 
New	perspectives	are	now	also	emerging	that	focus	on	regulating	the	processes	and	actions	of 
recommendation	systems.	Illustrating	how	deeply	embedded	recommendation	systems	are	in	the 
30	most	visited	websites,	Cobbe	and	Singh	have	argued	for	the	‘regulation	of	recommending’.  159
Their	suggestions	focus	on	making	clear	who	is	liable,	what	responsibilities	are	held	and	what 
obligations	should	be	placed	upon	those	making	these	targeted	recommendations.	Cobbe	and 
Singh’s	approach	places	the	emphasis	on	the	process	of	recommendation,	and	as	such	provides	a 
practical	intervention	for	regulating	this	form	of	targeting.  
156	Ofcom	(2018).	Addressing	Harmful	Online	Content.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_ﬁle/0022/120991/Addressing-harmful-online-content.pdf	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
157	TechUK.	(2019).	Tackling	Online	Harm.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.techuk.org/images/documents/principles_in_tackling_online_harms.pdf	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
158	Rajan,	A.	(2019).	Tech	giants	write	to	ministers	to	spell	out	views	on	internet	regula on.		BBC	News	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-47400140	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
159		Cobbe,	J.,	&	Singh,	J.	(2019).	Regula ng	Recommending:	Mo va ons,	Considera ons,	and	Principles.	
Considera ons,	and	Principles	.	
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General	Data	Protection	Regulation	(GDPR) 
Introduced	in	2018,	the	GDPR	sets	out	seven	core	principles—including	lawfulness,	accuracy	and 
storage	limitation—that	are	designed	to	protect	the	personal	data	of	EU	citizens.		According	to	a 
recent	BBC	article,	it	has	so	far	led	more	than	94,000	complaints,	more	than	64,000	data	breach 
notiﬁcations	and	€56m	of	ﬁnes	for	non-compliance.   160
In	addition	to	its	core	principles,	the	GDPR	also	sets	out	rights	in	relation	to	automated 
decision-making	and	proﬁling,	which	are	highly	relevant	to	online	targeting.	These	rules		require 
organizations	to	conduct	a	data	protection	impact	assessment,	inform	users	what	information	is 
included	in	any	proﬁling,	and	to	anonymize	the	personal	data	used	in	the	proﬁles.  161
Generally	this	has	been	viewed	by	the	marketing	industry	as	a	signiﬁcant	challenge	to	online 
targeting	practices,	and	thereby	to	the	fundamental	business	model	of	much	of	the	commercial 
web.	Under	the	new	regulation,	marketers	and	advertisers	are	legally	required	to	demonstrate	and 
certify	that	they	have	obtained	the	relevant	consent	to	utilize	users’	personal	data.  
Some	marketing	experts	claim	the	majority	of	personalised	advertising	may	contravene	GDPR 
since	much	of	the	data	used	is	obtained	from	a	‘supply	chain’	of	intermediary	‘data	brokers’.	As	a 
result,	there	is	no	way	of	ensuring	that	users	have	given	consent	for	every	purpose	for	which	their 
data	may	be	used	in	the	future.   162
It	remains	unclear,	particularly	at	this	early	stage,	whether	data	brokers	have	become	more 
transparent	and	accountable	following	the	enactment	of	GDPR. 	Signiﬁcant	criticisms	have	also 163
been	made	regarding	the	limited	scope	and	ambiguous	language	in	the	GDPR’s	data	rights 
deﬁnition.	Questions	remain	as	to	whether	citizens	actually	have	legal	protection	from	automated 
decision-making	processes. 		As	noted	in	section	2.3,	the	ICO	is	currently	handling	around	twice 164
as	many	complaints	under	the	GDPR	as	it	did	under	the	previous	data	protection	regime,	and	has 
launched	a	number	of	investigations	which	it	expects	to	conclude	soon,	which	will	give	an 
indication	of	the	likely	future	impact	of	the	GDPR.  
Privacy	and	Electronic	Communications	Regulations	(PECR) 
In	this	context,	another	important	set	of	regulations	are	PECR,	which	deal	with	privacy	rights	on 
electronic	communications,	including	the	use	of	cookies	or	similar	technologies.	PECR	were 
strengthened	in	2018	by	introducing	director	liability	for	serious	breaches	of	marketing	rules.  165
Importantly,	however,	the	EU	is	in	the	process	of	drawing	up	a	new	e-privacy	regulation	that	would 
replace	PECR	and	sit	alongside	GDPR.	This	would	signiﬁcantly	broaden	the	scope	of	the	existing 
160		See	Facebook,	Google	and	Twi er	in	data	regulators'	sights,	available	at:	
h ps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48357772	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
161	ICO.	Guide	to	the	general	Data	Protec on	Regula on—Individual	Rights.	Available	at:	
h ps://ico.org.uk/for-organisa ons/guide-to-data-protec on/guide-to-the-general-data-protec on-regula on-gdpr/i
ndividual-rights/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
162	Barne ,	M.	(2018).	How	GDPR	will	impact	Facebook,	Google	and	online	adver sing.		Marke ng	Week	.	
163	Christl,	W.	(2017).	Corporate	Surveillance	in	Everyday	Life.		Cracked	Labs	.	
164	Wachter,	S.,	Mi elstadt,	B.,	&	Floridi,	L.	(2017).	Why	a	right	to	explana on	of	automated	decision	making	does	not	
exist	in	the	general	data	protec on	regula on.		Interna onal	Data	Privacy	Law	7(2),	76-99.	
165	See	ICO	(2019).	What	are	PECR?	Available	at:			h ps://ico.org.uk/for-organisa ons/guide-to-pecr/what-are-pecr/	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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regulations,	including	making	it	easier	for	users	to	manage	cookies,	with	potentially	signiﬁcant 
consequences	for	companies	wishing	to	gather	personal	data.   166
Antitrust/competition	law 
Another	key	debate	concerns	the	role	of	competition	and	antitrust	law	in	defending	consumers’ 
privacy	and	ﬁghting	anti-competitive	hoarding	of	personal	data,	by	monopolistic	data	companies.
	In	the	UK,	the	Digital	Competition	Expert	Panel,	which	was	formed	in	September	2018,	published 167
its	report	on	competition	in	digital	markets,	ﬁnding	that	“greater	competition	in	digital	markets 
would	create	beneﬁts	for	consumers,	that	competition	is	currently	insuﬃcient	with 
winner-takes-most	dynamics	in	many	markets,	and	that	competition	is	possible	with	the	right	set 
of	policies”. 	The	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	has		asked	the	Competition	and	Markets	Authority 168
to	undertake	a	market	study	of	the	digital	advertising	market	as	soon	as	possible.  169
In	Germany,	the	Federal	Cartel	Oﬃce	(the	competition	watchdog)	recently	banned	Facebook	from 
combining	data	on	users	across	its	own	suite	of	social	platforms,	without	ﬁrst	gaining	their 
consent.	They	also	prohibited	Facebook	from	gathering	data	on	users	from	third	party 
websites—such	as	via	tracking	pixels	and	social	plug-ins—without	their	consent.	The	ban	is	a	direct 
challenge	to	Facebook’s	targeted	advertising	model	by	freezing	its	monopolistic	access	to	user 
data.	The	move	is	consistent	with	the	view	of	the	EU’s	competition	chief	that	restricting	access	to 
data	might	be	a	more	appropriate	solution	to	address	monopolistic	platform	power	than	breaking 
companies	up.  170
Although	similar	antitrust	proposals	have	been	raised,	others	counter	that	antitrust	law	and	the 
breaking	up	of	data	monopolies	is	a	narrow	privacy	remedy.	The	most	common	criticisms	include: 
● Lots	of	investment	with	uncertain	returns:	antitrust	action	requires	a	signiﬁcant	investment 
of	political	energy	and	time	that	has	a	very	uncertain	and	unclear	return	for	privacy 
protection. 
● Negative	unintended	consequences	:	in	the	absence	of	an	underpinning	comprehensive 
privacy	law,	antitrust	action	can	have	negative	unintended	consequences.	For	example 
actions	end	up	turning	one	privacy	offender	monopolist	into	several	privacy	offender 
competitors. 
● Limited	eﬃcacy:	antitrust	cannot	remedy	most	harms	caused	by	non-dominant	players.  171
166	Privacy	Trust.		Diﬀerence	between	GDPR	and	ePrivacy	regula on.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.privacytrust.com/guidance/gdpr-vs-eprivacy-regula on.html	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
167	Bartle ,	J.	(2018).		The	People	Vs	Tech:	How	the	internet	is	killing	democracy	(and	how	we	save	it)	.	Random	House.	
168	Digital	Compe  on	Expert	Panel.	(2019).	Unlocking	Digital	Compe  on.	Available	at:	
h ps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/a achment_data/ﬁle/785547/unlockin
g_digital_compe  on_furman_review_web.pdf	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
169	Spring	Statement	2019:	Philip	Hammond’s	speech,	available	at:	
h ps://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/spring-statement-2019-philip-hammonds-speech	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
170	Lomas,	N.	(2019).	German	an trust	oﬃce	limits	Facebook’s	data	gathering.		TechCrunch	,	available	at:	
h ps://techcrunch.com/2019/02/07/german-an trust-oﬃce-limits-facebooks-data-gathering	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
171	Kimmelman,	E.,	Feld,	H.,	&	Rossi,	A.	(2018).	The	limits	of	an trust	in	privacy	protec on.		Interna onal	Data	Privacy	
Law	,		8	(3),	270-276.	
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Although	there	is	debate	in	the	literature	about	how	competition	law	may	be	used	to	tackle	some	of 
the	issues	raised	here, 	we	must	remember	that	the	primary	aim	of	competition	law	is	not	privacy 172
protection	and	therefore,	it	can	not	be	expected	to	solve	all	problems	in	this	area. 
The	above	examples	are	not	comprehensive	and	serve	to	highlight	some	of	the	key	laws	in	this 
area.	There	are	other	laws	and	regulations	which	may	also	be	of	importance;	these	include	broad 
non-technology	related	law,	such	as	the	Equality	Act	2010	and	sector-speciﬁc	legislation. 
5.3.	Data	privacy	and	protection 
Online	targeting	relies	on	access	to	and	collection	of	personal	data,	and	as	such	poses	signiﬁcant 
privacy	risks.	Any	governance	response	to	online	targeting	would	need	to	address	the	potential	for 
privacy	and	data-breach	harms. 
Privacy	and	data	protection	by	design 
Privacy	by	design	(PbD)	is	a	design	philosophy	that	‘bakes-in’	privacy	during	the	development 
lifecycle	of	a	software	system.	Various	frameworks	and	privacy	design	strategies	have	been 
proposed	to	help	software	developers	design	and	implement	privacy	friendly	systems.  173
Under	the	EU	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	(GDPR),	PbD	has	been	superseded	by	‘data 
protection	by	design’	(DPbD),	which	legally	requires	data	controllers	to	apply	appropriate 
organizational	and	technical	measures	to	implement	data	protection	principles.	Neither	PbD	nor 
DPbD	are	uncontested	in	the	international	data	privacy	law	literature,	particularly	as	data	protection 
contains	a	number	of	rights,	such	as	access,	objection	and	erasure,	which	should	be	‘designed	in’ 
alongside	conﬁdentiality. 		Data	Protection	Impact	Assessments	are	a	key	privacy	enhancing 174
technology	for	compliance	with	GDPR.   175
Ethical	design 
Other	approaches	to	building-in	ethics	in	technology	design	include	ethical	design, 	and 176
‘responsible	technology’.	The	emphasis	in	these	approaches	is	in	ensuring	that	designers	of	digital 
systems	are	mindful	of	their	ethical,	social	and	human	impact.	The	values	which	underpin	ethical 
designs	can	vary	but	many	proposals	focus	on	security,	safety,	well-being,	inclusivity	and 
172	There	has	been	wide	debate	in	the	media	about	this,	plus	speciﬁc	calls	for	the	break-up	of	large	tech	companies,	see	
for	example	Brody,	B.,	&	Schuetz,	M.	(2019).	Warren	calls	for	break-up	of	tech	companies	like	Amazon	and	Facebook.	
Bloomberg	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar cles/2019-03-08/warren-has-plan-to-split-tech-cos-like-amazon-n-y- mes-says	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
173	Colesky,	M.,	Hoepman,	J.	H.,	&	Hillen,	C.	(2016,	May).	A	cri cal	analysis	of	privacy	design	strategies.	In		2016	IEEE	
Security	and	Privacy	Workshops	(SPW)	(33-40).	IEEE.	
174	Veale,	M.,	Binns,	R.,	&	Ausloos,	J.	(2018).	When	data	protec on	by	design	and	data	subject	rights	clash.	
Interna onal	Data	Privacy	Law	,		8	(2),	105-123.	
175	Binns,	R.	(2017).	Data	protec on	impact	assessments:	A	meta-regulatory	approach.		Interna onal	Data	Privacy	Law	,	
7	(1),	22-35.	
176	Ind.ie.	Ethical	Design	manifesto.	Available	at:		h ps://2017.ind.ie/ethical-design/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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autonomy. A	recent	example	is	a	set	of	guidelines	on	the	ethical	development	of	‘emotional	AI’ 177
applications	that	can	target	users	based	on	recorded	signals	of	their	mood.   178
Age-appropriate	design	code 
An	Age-Appropriate	Design	Code	for	online	services	likely	to	be	accessed	by	children	is	currently 
being	produced	by	the	Information	Commissioner’s	Oﬃce	for	delivery	to	government	by	late	2019. 
The	draft	code	released	for	consultation	in	April	2019	highlights	a	number	of	provisions	including; 
high	privacy	by	default,	geo-location	off	by	default,	the	upholding	of	published	age-restrictions, 
content	and	behaviour	rules	for	online	services,	preventing	auto-recommendation	of	content 
detrimental	to	a	child’s	health	and	wellbeing,	and	restrictions	on	addictive	features,	‘nudging’	or 
persuasion	techniques,	data-sharing,	commercial	targeting	and	other	forms	of	proﬁling.   179
Importantly,	the	draft	code	highlights	how	proﬁling	and	targeting	of	children	may	occur	through 
online	gaming	or	‘connected	toys’	that	are	part	of	the	‘Internet	of	Things’.	Online	games	are	able	to 
gather	signiﬁcant	data	about	children,	which	may	be	used	to	build	up	detailed	proﬁles	for	further 
recommendation	of	online	content,	purchases,	or	in-game	freemium	features.	A	response	to	the 
draft	code	by	the	5Rights	Foundation	suggests	it	should	take	a	stronger	line	with	regard	to	online 
proﬁling	of	children,	stating	that	a	child	must	not	be	proﬁled	unless:  
a)	Proﬁling	is	essential	to	the	service	or	feature	the	child	is	using  
b)	Appropriate	measures	are	in	place	to	protect	the	child	from	any	harmful	effects 
c)	It	is	in	a	child’s	best	interests.   180
The	response	includes	recommendations	for	a	series	of	‘tools’	to	safeguard	children’s	rights	online. 
Most	of	them	focus	on	making	it	clear	to	children,	what	is	happening	to	their	data.	Some	of	these 
tools	include: 
● A	‘show	me	who	has	seen	or	accessed	my	data’	tool 
● A	‘show	me	the	data	inferred	or	derived	from	my	personal	data’	tool 
● A	‘show	me	my	“proﬁle”’	tool 
● A	‘show	me	a	simpler	version	of	these	terms	and	conditions’	tool 
● A	‘reset	all	my	settings	to	default’	tool 
● A	‘show	me	what	geolocation	data	you	have	collected	on	me’	tool 
● An	‘opt	out	of	all	advertising	and	marketing’	tool 
● An	‘only	store	this	data	for	X	period	of	time’	tool 
177	James,	L.	(2018).	Oaths,	pledges	and	manifestos:	a	master	list	of	ethical	tech	values.		Medium	,	available	at:	
h ps://medium.com/doteveryone/oaths-pledges-and-manifestos-a-master-list-of-ethical-tech-values-26e2672e161c	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
178	Emo onal	ar ﬁcial	intelligence	guidelines	for	ethical	use.	Available	at:	
h ps://drive.google.com/ﬁle/d/1frAGcvCY_v25V8ylqgPF2brTK9UVj_5Z/view	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
For	background	on	responsible	innova on	and	the	ethics	of	emo on	AI,	see	McStay,	A.	(2018).		Emo onal	AI:	The	rise	
of	empathic	media	.	Sage.	
179	ICO	(2019).		Age	appropriate	design:	a	code	of	prac ce	for	online	services,	available	at:	
h ps://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consulta ons/2614762/age-appropriate-design-code-for-public-consulta on.
pdf	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
180	5Rights.	(2019).	5Rights’	interim	comments	on	the	dra 	Age	Appropriate	Design	Code,	available	at:	
h ps://5rightsfounda on.com/uploads/2019-05-13-5rights-interim-comments-on-the-dra -aadc.pdf	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
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In	some	cases	this	could	require	a	considerable	change	in	the	business	model	of	particular 
companies,	and	even	entire	sectors	such	as	the	online	video	game	industry,	when	they	are	currently 
reliant	on	facilitating	relatively	frictionless	access	to	their	services	by	children,	and	in	turn	collect 
data	on	them.  
5.4.	Ethics 
Ethical	frameworks	and	roadmaps 
Numerous	ethical	frameworks	have	been	proposed	to	encourage	responsible	use	of	data	and 
artiﬁcial	intelligence,	of	which	online	targeting	is	a	key	application.	One	prominent	study	has 
identiﬁed	more	than	40	published	‘ethical	principles’	across	a	range	of	organizations,	and 
synthesized	these	into	5	overarching	principles	: 
● Beneﬁcence:	promoting	well-being,	preserving	dignity,	and	sustaining	the	planet 
● Non-maleﬁcence:	privacy,	security	and	‘capability	caution’ 
● Autonomy:		the	power	to	decide,	which	requires	striking	a	balance	between	the 
decision-making	power	of	autonomous	humans	and	that	delegated	to	artiﬁcial	agents 
● Justice:	promoting	prosperity	and	preserving	solidarity 
● Explicability:	enabling	the	other	principles	through	intelligibility	and	accountability  181
The	Ada	Lovelace	Institute	has	proposed	the	development	of	an	approach	based	on	the	model	of 
the	Nuﬃeld	Council	of	Bioethics.	The	bioethics	council	was	designed	to	sit	‘upstream’	of 
regulation,	identifying	issues	in	the	biological	and	medical	sciences	and	opening	them	up	for 
deliberation	before	regulation	is	required.  182
In	collaboration	with	the	Leverhulme	Centre	for	the	Future	of	Intelligence,	the	Nuﬃeld	Foundation 
has	produced	a	roadmap	for	research	on	the	ethical	and	societal	implications	of	technologies 
driven	by	algorithms,	data	and	AI.	Its	main	focus	is	on	identifying	and	resolving	tensions	between 
the	ways	technology	may	both	threaten	and	support	different	values.	The	roadmap	identiﬁes	four 
central	tensions: 
● Accuracy	vs.	fairness:	using	algorithms	to	make	decisions	and	predictions	more	accurate 
versus	ensuring	fair	and	equal	treatment. 
● Personalisation	vs.	solidarity	:	reaping	the	beneﬁts	of	increased	personalisation	in	the	digital 
sphere		versus	enhancing	solidarity	and	citizenship. 
● Eﬃciency	vs.	privacy	:	using	data	to	improve	the	quality	and	eﬃciency	of	services		versus 
respecting	the	privacy	and	informational	autonomy	of	individuals. 
181	Cowls,	J.,	&	Floridi,	L.	(2018).	Prolegomena	to	a	White	Paper	on	an	Ethical	Framework	for	a	Good	AI	Society.	
182	Gardam,	T.	(2019).	Data	science	and	the	case	for	ethical	responsibility.		Ada	Lovelace	Ins tute	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.adalovelaceins tute.org/the-culture-of-compu ng-and-the-case-for-ethical-responsibility/	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
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● Convenience	vs.	self-actualisation:	Using	automation	to	make	people’s	lives	more 
convenient		versus	promoting	self-actualisation	and	dignity.  183
Critiques	of	ethics	frameworks 
Many	of	the	current	ethical	frameworks,	however,	have	been	produced	through	industry-led 
initiatives,	raising	critical	questions	about	how	data	ethics	are	being	framed,	and	how	speciﬁc 
kinds	of	solutions	are	being	promoted. 	Concerns	have	been	raised	about	‘ethics-washing’—the 184
aimless	discussion	of	ethics,	in	the	place	of	meaningful	action	or	regulation. 	Concern	has	also 185
been	raised	about	‘ethics-shopping’,	where	ethics	are	approached	in	a	selective	way	and	are 
reduced	to	a	checklist	exercise.   186
One	study	of	a	range	of	ethical	frameworks	highlights	a	number	of	problems:  187
● Expert	oversight:	some	initiatives	are	currently	framed	as	projects	of	expert	oversight,	with 
primarily	technical	and	legal	experts	articulating	concerns	and	implementing	mostly 
technical	and	legal	solutions. 
● Determinism:		it	is	taken	as	given	that	technologies:	a)	are	coming	and	b)	will	replace	a 
broad	swathe	of	human	jobs	and	decisions,	thereby	limiting	ethical	debate	to	‘appropriate’ 
design	and	implementation.	They	imply	that	the	current	advance	of	technology	is 
unstoppable	and	irresistible. 
● Technology	as	the	focus	of	ethical	scrutiny:	the	ethical	design	of	targeting	and	other 
technologies	is	placed	in	the	foreground,	while	wider	ethical	issues	about	commercial 
control	and	business	ethics	are	marginalized. 
A	recent	special	issue	on	‘	Governing	Artiﬁcial	Intelligence	’	published	by	the	Royal	Society		highlights 
the	need	for	initiatives	to	be	led	by	institutions	other	than	industry.	They	suggest	more	serious 
consideration	of	the	need	for	‘hard	regulation’	based	on	rule	of	law,	human	rights	and	democratic 
principles.  188
As	such,	while	speciﬁc	ethical	principles	related	to	online	targeting	are	clearly	essential,	it	will	not 
be	suﬃcient	to	simply	subscribe	to	pre-existing	statements	or	frameworks.   
183		Whi lestone,	J.,	Nyrup,	R.,	Alexandrova,	A.,	Dihal,	K.,	&	Cave,	S.	(2019).	Ethical	and	societal	implica ons	of	
algorithms,	data,	and	ar ﬁcial	intelligence:	a	roadmap	for	research.	Nuﬃeld	Founda on.	
184	Greene,	D.,	Hoﬀmann,	A.	L.,	&	Stark,	L.	(2019).	Be er,	Nicer,	Clearer,	Fairer:	A	Cri cal	Assessment	of	the	Movement	
for	Ethical	Ar ﬁcial	Intelligence	and	Machine	Learning.	In		Proceedings	of	the	52nd	Hawaii	Interna onal	Conference	on	
System	Sciences	.	
185	See	for	example,	Kitchin,	R.	(2019).	The	ethics	of	Smart	Ci es.		RTE	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2019/0425/1045602-the-ethics-of-smart-ci es/		[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
186		Wagner,	B.	(2018).	Ethics	as	an	escape	from	regula on:	From	ethics-washing	to	ethics-shopping.		Being	Proﬁled:	
Cogitas	Ergo.	Sum	Amsterdam	University	Press,	Amsterdam	,	84-90.	
187	Greene,	D.,	Hoﬀmann,	A.	L.,	&	Stark,	L.	(2019).	Be er,	Nicer,	Clearer,	Fairer:	A	Cri cal	Assessment	of	the	Movement	
for	Ethical	Ar ﬁcial	Intelligence	and	Machine	Learning.	In	Proceedings	of	the	52nd	Hawaii	Interna onal	Conference	on	
System	Sciences.	
188	Cath,	C.	(2018).	Governing	ar ﬁcial	intelligence:	ethical,	legal	and	technical	opportuni es	and	challenges.	For	other	
contribu ons	to	the	special	issue	see:		h ps://royalsocietypublishing.org/toc/rsta/376/2133	.	
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5.5.	Transparency	and	technology	solutions 
Ad	transparency 
A	key	response	to	online	targeting	is	to	increase	transparency.	In	the	ﬁeld	of	advertising	this	has 
led	to	efforts	to	demonstrate	‘ad	transparency’,	disclosing	how	ﬁrms	collect	and	use		personal	data 
to	generate	behaviorally	targeted	ads.	It	is	hoped	that	this	transparency	can	empower	consumers 
and	encourage	better	marketing	practices.  
One	form	which	ad	transparency	can	take	is	the	creation	of	searchable	archives	of	current	and 
previous	adverts	which	have	been	hosted	on	platforms.	As	mentioned	in	section	2.3,	Facebook 
responded	to	its	‘dark	ads’	scandal	with	a	searchable	archive	of	active	political	ads,	although	this 
has	not	included	historic	ads	prior	to	October	2018. 	Google	has	also	produced	its	own	ad	archive 189
API,	although	they	missed	their	own	deadline	to	roll	this	out	to	Europe	prior	to	the	European 
elections	of	May	2019. 	However,	Mozilla	has	pushed	for	both	companies	to	do	more	on	making 190
their	ad	archives	truly	open,	transparent	and	accessible.  191
Technological	applications	for	ad	transparency	can	enable	consumers	to	understand	how	their 
personal	data	is	used	to	make	targeted	or	personalised	recommendations.	From	an	industry 
perspective	ad	transparency	has	the	potential	to	backﬁre	when	it	exposes	marketing	practices	that 
violate	consumer	beliefs	of	how	their	information	ought	to	ﬂow	between	parties.	This	can	reduce 
ad	effectiveness	by	increasing	consumers’	relative	concern	for	their	privacy.  192
Oﬃcial	organisations	are	also	starting	to	take	notice.	In	June	2018	the	UK	Electoral	Commission 
published	a	report	on	increasing	transparency	in	digital	campaigning,	which	recommended	new 
legislation	so	that	online	materials	produced	by	parties,	candidates	and	campaigners	have	to	have 
an	imprint	stating	who	has	created	them. 	In	October	2018	the	EU	published	its	own	Code	of 193
Practice	on	Disinformation,	which	sets	out	that	advertisements	“should	be	clearly	distinguishable 
from	editorial	content”	and	“public	disclosure	of	political	advertising”	should	be	enabled. 	Google 194
and	Facebook	have	both	signed	up	to	this	agreement,	and	are	expected	to	deliver	on	its	speciﬁc 
points	over	the	course	of	2019.	Should	these	companies	fail	to	act,	the	European	Commission	has 
made	clear	that	they	could	step	in	with	enforceable	action. 
189	Facebook.	Facebook	Ad	Library.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?ac ve_status=all&ad_type=poli cal_and_issue_ads&country=GB	[accessed	
on:	27/06/19].	
190	Mozilla.	(2019).	Google’s	Ad	API	is	Be er	Than	Facebook’s,	But…	Available	at:	
h ps://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/05/10/googles-ad-api-is-be er-than-facebooks-but/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
191	Mozilla.	(2019).	Google’s	Ad	API	is	Be er	Than	Facebook’s,	But…	Available	at:	
h ps://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/05/10/googles-ad-api-is-be er-than-facebooks-but/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
192	Kim,	T.,	Barasz,	K.,	&	John,	L.	K.	(2018).	Why	am	I	seeing	this	ad?	The	eﬀect	of	ad	transparency	on	ad	eﬀec veness.	
Journal	of	Consumer	Research	,		45	(5),	906-932.	
193	Electoral	Commission	(2018).	Urgent	improvements	needed	to	ensure	transparency	for	voters	in	digital	age,	says	
Electoral	Commission.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/reviews-and-research
-to-keep/urgent-improvements-needed-to-ensure-transparency-for-voters-in-digital-age,-says-electoral-commission	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
194	European	Commission	(2018).	Code	of	Prac ce	on	Disinforma on.	Available	at:	
h ps://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-prac ce-disinforma on	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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Adblock	software 
The	clearest	technology	solution	to	online	targeting	in	advertising	for	individuals	is	ad	blocking 
software.	Multiple	adblock	applications	are	cheaply	or	freely	available	as	browser	extensions.	The 
market	for	adblockers	has	accelerated	rapidly	in	recent	years,	with	2017	data	suggesting	over	600 
million	devices	worldwide	now	have	the	software	installed.	This	ﬁgure	surged	for	mobile	devices	in 
particular	after	Apple	announced	adblocking	would	be	possible	on	IoS	devices	in	2015.   195
However,	adblocking	is	a	major	concern	for	the	advertising	industry,	and	for	platforms	or 
publishers	that	depend	on	ads	for	their	revenue. 		Ad	blocking	and	other	tracking	blockers	do	not 196
adequately	address	other	forms	of	tracking	and	targeting	that	do	not	classify	as	advertising. 
Privacy	Enhancing	Technologies	(PETs) 
More	broadly,	there	is	also	the	emerging	ﬁelds	of	PETs.	The	Royal	Society	recently	published	a 
report	looking	into	this	area,	and	identiﬁed	a	number	of	promising	areas	of	development,	including 
homomorphic	encryption	(which,	to	varying	degrees,	allows	encrypted	data	to	remain	encrypted 
even	while	it	is	processed	by	cloud	platforms,	and	differential	privacy,	which	allows	organisations 
to	release	data	without	compromising	the	privacy	of	individuals	whose	data	may	be	contained 
within	those	datasets.	One	of	the	most	promising	areas	from	the	perspective	of	online	targeting	is 
the	concept	of	personal	data	stores,	which	allows	individuals	to	locally	store	their	own	personal 
data,	and	release	it	in	a	controlled	way	to	organisations	they	trust.  197
Political	ad	collectors 
Researchers	and	activists	have	begun	scrutinizing	the	reach	and	extent	of	political	advertising 
online.	For	example,	ProPublica’s	Facebook	Political	Ad	Collector	is	a	browser	plugin	that	allows 
Facebook	users	to	automatically	see	the	political	ads	that	are	displayed	in	their	News	Feeds,	along 
with	their	targeting	information.	ProPublica	updates	the	collection	hourly	as	a	way	of	making 
political	advertising	more	transparent	to	the	public.   198
Who	Targets	Me?	is	a	similar	browser	extension	capturing	data	about	political	Facebook	ads,	and 
has	been	designed	to	increase	transparency	in	elections.	Set	up	as	a	citizen-led,	non-partisan	effort 
to	monitor	political	adverts,	it	helps	researchers	and	journalists	understand	the	use	of	targeted 
social	media	advertising	by	political	campaigns.  199
Within	the	tech	industry	itself,	a	number	of	large	platforms,	including	Facebook,	Google	and	Twitter 
have	begun	to	maintain	searchable	databases	on	political	advertising,	making	it	easier	for	people 
to	see	when	paid	political	adverts	have	been	bought	on	their	sites.			However,	organisations	such	as 
195	FairPage.	(2017).	The	state	of	the	blocked	web:	2017	Global	Adblock	Report.	Available	at:	
h ps://pagefair.com/downloads/2017/01/PageFair-2017-Adblock-Report.pdf	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
196	Benner,	K.,	&	Ember,	S.	(2015).	Enabling	of	Ad	Blocking	in	Apple’s	iOS	9	Prompts	Backlash.		The	New	York	Times	,	
available	at:	
h ps://www.ny mes.com/2015/09/19/technology/apple-ios-9s-enabling-of-ad-blocking-prompts-backlash.html	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
197	The	Royal	Society.	(2019).	Protec ng	privacy	in	prac ce.	Available	at:	
h ps://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/privacy-enhancing-technologies/privacy-enhancing-technologies-rep
ort.pdf	[accessed	08/07/19]	
198		Merrill,	J.	B.,	Levine,	A.	J.,	Tobin,	A.,	Larson,	J.,	&	Angwin,	J.	(2018)	Facebook	Poli cal	Ad	Collector:	How	Poli cal	
Adver sers	Target	You.		ProPublica	,	available	at:		h ps://projects.propublica.org/facebook-ads/	[accessed	on:	
27/06/19].	
199	Who	Targets	Me?,	available	at:		h ps://whotargets.me/en/about-who-targets-me/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
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Mozilla	have	been	critical	of	these	efforts	for	being	far	too	limited	for	the	purposes	of	research, 
and	have	set	out	ambitious	design	principles	for	them	which	have	yet	to	be	met.   200
Personal	data	stores 
Personal	Data	Stores	(PDSs)	have	been	proposed	as	technical	solutions	to	give	individuals	more 
control	over	their	data,	in	the	face	of	mass	corporate	ownership.	PDSs	offer	to	store	the	user’s 
personal	data	as	well	as	the	ability	to	control	which	organisations	can	access	it.	The	beneﬁts	of 
PDSs	are	that	they	can	increase	data	security,	reduce	vulnerability	to	data	breaches	and	increase 
awareness	of	data	issues	for	users.  201
PDSs	launched	over	the	last	decade	include Mydex, SOLID,	Hub	of	All	Things,	Citizen-me 
and digi.me.	So	far,	none	have	achieved	signiﬁcant	market	penetration,	suggesting	little	current 
public	awareness	of	PDSs.  
Data	trusts 
The	innovation	charity	Nesta	has	proposed	that	governing	data	for	the	public	good	of	society	will 
require	a	‘new	family	of	institutions	under	the	umbrella	title	of	data	trusts,	tailored	to	different 
conditions	of	consent,	and	different	patterns	of	private	and	public	value’.	Data	trusts	would	share 
common	standards	to	ensure	data	security,	compliance	and	technical	treatment.   202
A	data	trust	‘works	within	the	law	to	provide	ethical,	architectural	and	governance	support	for 
trustworthy	data	processing’.	Some	core	features	of	a	data	trust	include:  
● Deﬁnes	trustworthy	parameters:	deﬁnes	a	certain	level	of	trustworthy	behaviour	for	data 
science 
● Ethical	code	:	subscribes	to	a	meaningful	ethical	code 
● Code	of	governance:	features	an	agreed	‘code	of	governance’	or	an	‘architecture’	that	‘allows 
data	to	be	discovered	and	used,	promoting	accountability	and	transparency,	without	the 
data	leaving	the	hands	of	data	controllers’ 
● Clear	and	agreed	beneﬁciaries:	has	agreed	beneﬁciaries	whose	rights	need	to	be	deﬁned 
and	whose	trust	is	to	be	earned.  203
Different	sorts	of	data	trusts	could	be	established	to	serve	various	interests—such	as	trusts	in 
speciﬁc	industries,	or	in	public	sector	institutions.  
The	concept	of	data	trusts	are	now	being	actively	trialled,	with	the	Open	Data	Institute	launching 
three	pilot	schemes	in	January	2019,	which	concluded	at	the	end	of	March.	They	focused	on 
200		Mozilla.	(2019).	Facebook	and	Google:	This	is	What	an	Eﬀec ve	Ad	Archive	API	Looks	Like,	available	at:	
h ps://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/03/27/facebook-and-google-this-is-what-an-eﬀec ve-ad-archive-api-looks-like	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
201	Bolychevsky,	I.,	&	Worthington,	S.	(2018).	Are	personal	data	stores	about	to	become	the	next	big	thing?		Medium	,	
available	at:	
h ps://medium.com/@shevski/are-personal-data-stores-about-to-become-the-next-big-thing-b767295ed842	
[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
202	Mulgan,	G.,	&	Straub,	V.	(2019).	The	new	ecosystem	of	trust.		Nesta	,	available	at:	
h ps://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/new-ecosystem-trust/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
203		O'hara,	K.	(2019).	Data	Trusts:	Ethics,	Architecture	and	Governance	for	Trustworthy	Data	Stewardship.	
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tackling	illegal	wildlife	trade,	reducing	food	waste	(both	funded	by	the	Government	Oﬃce	for	AI), 
and	improving	public	services	in	Greenwich	(funded	by	Innovate	UK).  204
5.6.	Public	education	and	awareness-raising 
Raising	public	awareness 
Signiﬁcant	efforts	have	been	made	to	raise	wider	public	awareness	of	online	tracking	and 
targeting,	both	in	relation	to	personal	data	in	commercial	advertising,	marketing	and	political	online 
campaigns.	In	the	UK,	the	ICO	recently	launched	its	‘Be	Data	Aware’	campaign,	in	a	bid	to	help 
people	learn	about	how	companies	are	using	their	data,	and	what	measures	they	can	take	to	better 
control	their	own	personal	data.  205
In	the	US,	ProPublica’s	2016	campaign	‘	Breaking	the	Black	Box	’	aimed	to	raise	public	awareness	of 
how	the	social	media	platform	Facebook	makes	use	of	customer	data	for	ad	targeting.	They	also 
produced	a	browser	extension	to	allow	users	to	see	what	data	Facebook	holds	about	them.  206
During	the	US	midterm	elections	in	2018,	ProPublica	then	released	‘	The	User’s	Guide	to	Democracy	’, 
a	series	of	public	awareness-raising	guides	to	enable	the	reader	‘to	become	a	smarter,	more 
engaged,	more	empowered	voter’. 	These	initiatives	suggest	signiﬁcant	levels	of	public	interest	in 207
key	issues	raised	by	online	targeting	in	both	the	commercial	and	political	spheres.	However, 
ProPublica’s	efforts	have	since	been	frustrated	after	Facebook	added	measures	to	prevent	the	use 
of	tools	which	reveal	how	adverts	are	being	targeted	on	their	platform,	a	move	which	effectively 
disabled	ProPublica’s	own	transparency	tool.  208
In	relation	to	the	online	targeting	of	children	and	young	people,	CommonSense	Media	has 
produced	video	content	to	help	raise	awareness	of	the	techniques	used	to	collect	and	utilize 
personal	data	for	advertising	and	web	recommendations.   209
A	remaining	challenge	with	these	public	education	initiatives	is	that	they	are	only	likely	to	reach	a 
very	slim	selection	of	the	population.  210
Data	literacy 
Calls	for	data	literacy	education	have	proliferated. 	Key	features	of	data	literacy	frameworks 211
include: 
● Awareness	:	Understanding	data	and	its	role	in	society 
204	ODI	(2019).	How	can	we	make	data	work	for	everyone,	available	at:	
h ps://theodi.org/ar cle/huge-appe te-for-data-trusts-according-to-new-odi-research/	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
205	ICO.	Be	data	aware,	available	at:		h ps://ico.org.uk/bedataaware	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
206	Angwin,	J.,	Parris,	T.,	&	Ma u,	S.	(2016).	Breaking	the	Black	Box.	What	Facebook	Knows	About	You.		ProPublica	.	
207	ProPublica.	(2018).	A	User’s	Guide	to	Democracy,	available	at:	
h ps://www.propublica.org/series/a-users-guide-to-democracy	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
208	Propublica.	(2019).	Facebook	Moves	to	Block	Ad	Transparency	Tools—Including	Ours,	available	at:	
h ps://www.propublica.org/ar cle/facebook-blocks-ad-transparency-tools	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
209	Common	Sense	Educa on.	Online	targe ng	and	tracking,	available	at:	
h ps://www.commonsense.org/educa on/videos/online-targe ng-and-tracking-anima on	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
210	Pangrazio,	L.	&	Selwyn,	N.	(2019).	Personal	data	literacies:		A	cri cal	literacies	approach	to	enhancing	
understandings	of	personal	digital	data.	New	Media	&	Society	21(2):	419-437.	
211	Ridsdale,	C.,	Rothwell,	J.,	Smit,	M.,	Ali-Hassan,	H.,	Bliemel,	M.,	Irvine,	D.,	...	&	Wuetherick,	B.	(2015).	Strategies	and	
best	prac ces	for	data	literacy	educa on:	Knowledge	synthesis	report.	
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● Access	:	Understanding	how	to	identify,	locate	and	appropriately	use	datasets	and 
databases  
● Engagement	:	Evaluate,	analyse,	organise,	interpret,	and	make	decisions	based	on	existing 
data 
● Management:	Plan	and	manage	data,	including	organisation	and	analysis,	security 
protocols	for	data	storage,	sharing	data,	and	data-driven	documentation 
● Communication	:	Synthesise,	create	visualisations	and	data	representations  
● Ethical	Use:	Identify	diversiﬁed	data	sources,	in	particular	data	from	human	and	social 
activity,	considering	the	risks	of	managing	such	data,	and	understand	the	issues	implicit	in 
the	use	of	data  
● Preservation	:	Be	aware	of	long–term	practices	of	storing,	using	and	reusing	data  212
The	European	Commission’s	Digital	Competence	Framework	for	Citizens	(DigComp)	features 
graduated	levels	of	competence,	from	basic	foundational	skills	to	advanced	specialization, 
organized	in	three	areas	of	data	and	information	literacy.  213
Other	issues	with	digital	literacy	as	a	solution	are	that:  
● this	approach	places	the	onus	and	burden	on	the	individual	to	understand	these	issues	and 
modify	their	behavior,	rather	than	requiring	the	ﬁrms	involved	to	change	their	practices; 
● it	is	unlikely	that	all	countries	will	reach	100%	digital	literacy	rates,	at	least	in	the	short	to 
medium	term;	and 
● it	can	be	very	challenging	to	effectively	integrate	digital	literacy	teaching	within	traditional 
educational	programmes.  214
Areas	for	future	research 
● Research	into	data	governance	initiatives	and	their	effects	on	targeting:	There	is	a	need	for 
in-depth,	impartial	and	comparative	studies	of	new	and	emerging	data	governance 
programs	and	frameworks	to	understand	their	effects	on	different	modes	of	targeting. 
Such	studies	would	generate	better	understanding	of	the	effectiveness,	beneﬁts	and 
challenges	to	adoption	of	different	data	governance	approaches.	Findings	of	such 
research	would	offer	insights	for	companies,	public	sector	organizations,	and 
government	departments	to	ensure	that	any	beneﬁts	of	targeting	can	be	pursued	further 
while	minimising	any	identiﬁed	risks	and	threats. 
212	Raﬀaghelli,	J.	E.,	Manca,	S.,	Stewart,	B.,	Prinsloo,	P.,	&	Sangrà,	A.	Towards	a	cri cal	perspec ve	on	data	literacy	in	
higher	educa on.	Emerging	prac ces	and	challenges.		Interna onal	Journal	of	Educa onal	Technology	in	Higher	
Educa on	,	available	at:		h ps://educa onaltechnologyjournal.springeropen.com/dataliteracyhighered	[accessed	on	
09/07/19]	
213	Carretero,	S.,	Vuorikari,	R.,	&	Punie,	Y.	(2017).		DigComp	2.1:	The	Digital	Competence	Framework	for	Ci zens	with	
eight	proﬁciency	levels	and	examples	of	use	(No.	JRC106281).	Joint	Research	Centre	(Seville	site).	
214	See	for	discussion	on	this	point:	Lam,	C.,	&	Wong,	C.	(2017).	Challenges	for	Digital	Literacy	in	English	Curriculum.	In	
Teach4DH@	GSCL.	Available	at		h p://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1918/lam.pdf	[accessed	on	27/07/19]	and	Hunter,	J.	(2017).	The	
four	challenges	Australia	faces	to	improve	the	digital	literacy	of	new	teachers.	EduResearch	Ma ers.	Available	at:	
h ps://www.aare.edu.au/blog/?p=2106	[accessed	on:	27/06/19].	
54	
7/19/2019 190715 Landscape Summary - Online Targeting - Formatted - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/19D3YqA8a9xyNzLsoOJnKET9itPffoOBBSYTipqk0oyc/edit 55/59
● Evaluation	of	the	effect	of	emerging	regulatory	frameworks	on	existing	and	emerging 
techniques	of	targeting:	With	multiple	new	regulatory	frameworks	coming	into	effect,	in 
development	or	undergoing	consultation,	ongoing	evaluative	research	is	required	to 
understand	their	effects,	beneﬁts	and	other	potential	unintended	consequences	for 
individuals,	organizations	and	society. 
● Review	of	privacy	instruments	and	their	effects	on	different	forms	of	targeting	in	context: 
Privacy-protecting	approaches	such	as	privacy	by	design,	data	protection	by	design,	and 
ethical	design	need	to	be	reviewed	in	speciﬁc	contexts	to	examine	their	effectiveness	in 
terms	of	addressing	targeting.	Such	studies	would	also	generate	better	understanding	of 
barriers	to	adoption,	consequences	of	adoption,	and	any	unintended	effects	where	they 
are	deployed. 
● Research	on	applied	data	ethics	:	Data	ethics	research	is	required	in	applied	settings	to 
understand	the	ethical	issues	of	targeting	across	speciﬁc	sectors	of	society	(public 
sector,	commerce,	advertising	etc).	Other	studies	would	seek	to	understand	how	different 
data	ethics	approaches	have	been	adopted	and	their	effects	on	those	settings	and 
sectors.	The	relationship	of	ethics	to	law	and	regulation	in	speciﬁc	settings	also	needs	to 
be	better	understood	where	ethics	frameworks	or	commitments	to	data	ethics	may	not 
align	with	existing	legal	and	regulatory	frameworks. 
● The	usefulness	of	privacy-enhancing	technologies	remains	unclear:		Privacy-enhancing 
technologies	such	as	personal	data	stores	and	data	trusts	are	an	emerging	area	of 
technical	protection	against	targeting,	but	there	is	little	evaluative	research	on	their	use	in 
practice.	Studies	should	seek	to	examine	their	uptake,	usefulness	and	effectiveness 
where	such	technologies	are	being	used. 
● Research	on	public	education	and	awareness-raising	initiatives:		Analysis	is	required	of 
existing	and	emerging	public	education	and	awareness-raising	initiatives	and	campaigns 
that	focus	on	protecting	citizens	from	targeting,	examining	their	beneﬁts	and	constraints 
for	different	organizations	and	groups	across	society.	Such	studies	would	generate 
insights	for	the	further	development	of	programs	or	resources	that	might	be	used	in 
formal	education	settings	or	for	public	awareness	raising	about	targeting	among	social 
groups	and	citizens. 
 
   
55	
7/19/2019 190715 Landscape Summary - Online Targeting - Formatted - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/19D3YqA8a9xyNzLsoOJnKET9itPffoOBBSYTipqk0oyc/edit 56/59
6. Conclusion 
 
Online	targeting	is	already	widespread	and	sophisticated,	but	it	continues	to	grow	and	evolve. 
Almost	all	online	advertising	is	targeted	in	some	way	and	the	amount	spent	on	online	advertising	is 
increasing	rapidly.	At	the	same	time,	techniques	are	becoming	more	advanced,	with	microtargeting, 
for	example,	giving	organisations	ever	more	choice	about	how,	when	and	who	a	message	is 
delivered	to.	Many	are	concerned	about	the	risks	of	targeting,	but	closer	inspection	reveals	a 
complicated	mix	of	costs	and	beneﬁts.	What	is	clear	is	that	online	targeting	is	a	practice	with 
growing	inﬂuence	over	our	lives	that	remains	relatively	poorly	understood. 
The	task	of	understanding	more	about	online	targeting	is	a	challenging	one.	Our	effort	to	build	a 
detailed	picture	of	online	targeting	has	been	hindered	by	a	lack	of	core	texts,	the	novelty	of	the 
ﬁeld,	the	wide	range	of	terms	used	to	describe	different	subjects	and	the	rapid	evolution	of	the 
underlying	technology.	Further	research	in	this	ﬁeld	will	be	needed	to	address	the	gaps	in 
knowledge	identiﬁed	in	this	report.  
Overall,	what	we	have	found	is	that	public	awareness	of	online	targeting	is	limited.	There	is	a	lack 
of	certainty	about	online	targeting	and	attitudes	towards	it;	and	attitudes	vary	once	individuals 
receive	a	greater	explanation	of	how	these	systems	work..	Further	to	this,	and	despite	some 
outstanding	research,	we	are	only	beginning	to	fully	understand	both	the	attitudes	that	individuals 
have	towards	online	targeting	and	their	understanding	of	it.	The	existing	research	indicates	that 
attitudes	towards	online	targeting	vary	between	age	groups.	Beyond	this	we	have	little	sense	of 
how	attitudes	vary	across	social	and	demographic	groups.	Similarly,	ongoing	research	will	be 
needed	to	explore	how	attitudes	to	online	targeting	change	over	time	and	with	the	integration	of 
new	technologies. 
We	are	in	the	early	stages	of	understanding	and	anticipating	the	harms	and	beneﬁts	of	online 
targeting	for	different	stakeholders.	Much	of	the	existing	research	focuses	upon	individual	and 
social	harms.	The	report	ﬁnds	a	series	of	forms	of	governance	that	might	be	used	to	complement 
regulation.	Given	this	position,	the	review	has	outlined	some	potential	opportunities	for	the 
governance	of	online	targeting	in	the	current	literature,	but	these	are	provisional	and	will	need 
developing	as	our	knowledge	of	online	targeting	advances.	As	such,	the	ﬁndings	identiﬁed	in	the 
four	sections	of	the	report	are	as	much	about	the	gaps	in	understanding,	as	they	are	about 
deﬁnitive	insights	into	the	outcomes	of	online	targeting	and	how	these	can	be	managed.	This 
points	to	a	wider	lack	of	transparency	in	the	sector,	which	is	currently	deﬁned	by	a	well-developed, 
but	still	largely	invisible	ecosystem	of	highly	targeted	advertising,	and	platforms	which	are	not 
incentivised	to	provide	researchers,	legislators	and	regulators	with	access	to	their	data	or	their 
algorithms.  
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Glossary 
 
 
Algorithm:	A	set	of	precise	instructions	that	describe	how	to	process	information,	typically	in	orde
to	perform	a	calculation	or	solve	a	problem.	Algorithms	have	to	be	described	in	programming 
language	to	be	executed	on	computers. 
Artiﬁcial	Intelligence	(AI)	:	An	area	of	computer	science	that	aims	to	replicate	human 
intelligence	in	computers.	Deﬁnitions	focus	either	on	achieving	human	performance	in	complex 
tasks,	or	on	mimicking	the	ways	in	which	these	tasks	are	performed	by	humans.	In	a	commercial 
context,	AI	currently	refers	mainly	to	systems	that	use	machine	learning	for	pattern	detection, 
prediction,	human-machine	dialog,	and	robotic	control. 
Attribute:	A	variable	used	as	part	of	the	description	of	a	data	sample	or	classiﬁer,	for	example	a 
speciﬁc	pixel	in	a	camera	image,	or	the	gender	column	in	a	spreadsheet	describing	employees. 
Autonomy:		Self-agency	and	the	ability	to	make	decisions	unimpeded	and	free	from	manipulation 
or	coercion. 
Behavioural	targeting:	A	form	of	targeting	concerned	with	the	tracking	of	online	behaviours,	usuall
based	on	the	gathering	of	data	of	sites	visited,	as	well	as	search	terms	and	apps	being	used,	in	ord
make	predictions	or	to	match	content	with	particular	users.. 
Big	Data:	A	term	used	to	describe	the	vast	amount	of	data	which	is	currently	being	collected	and 
utilised.	There	are	multiple	and	varying	deﬁnitions	of	what	is	meant	by	big	data,	but	it	is	often 
described	in	terms	of	‘the	three	Vs’:		volume	(the	quantity	of	data),	velocity	(the	speed	of	data 
processing)	and	variety	(the	types	of	data	involved).  
Clickbait:	Clickbait	is	a	form	of	online	ad	or	media	story	that	is	intended	to	entice	users	into 
clicking	on	it	by	presenting	emotionally	charged	or	sensational	content.	Developing	shareable, 
‘viral’	media	is	the	primary	goal	of	those	deploying	clickbait,	as	it	enables	them	to	reach	more 
people,	and	often	gather	data	and	build	proﬁles	based	on	their	interests	in	the	process. 
Dark	Ads:	Dark	advertising	is	a	type	of	advertising	where	the	messaging	can	only	be	seen	by	the 
advertiser	and	the	speciﬁc	target	group—other	people	with	dissimilar	interests	or	who	fall 
outside	of	the	target	group	will	usually	be	completely	unaware	of	their	existence. 
Data	Anxiety:	A	term	coined	by	Sarah	Pink	et	al, 	to	describe	the	anxiety	people	feel	about	the 215
(mis)use	of	data	about	them,	as	well	as	the	coping	mechanisms	they	ﬁnd	to	deal	with	this 
anxiety. 
Demographic	targeting:	Targeting	which	draws	upon	demographic	data	such	as	age,	gender, 
occupation	and	location. 
215		Pink,	S.,	Lanzeni,	D.,	&	Horst,	H.	(2018).	Data	anxie es:	Finding	trust	in	everyday	digital	mess.		Big	Data	&	Society	,	
5	(1).	
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Feedback	loop:	An	aspect	of	systems	in	which	some	element	of	the	output	is	subsequently	used 
as	an	input	for	future	operations.	In	the	context	of	online	targeting,	this	relates	to	how	the	data 
produced	through	actions	taken	online	informs	targeting	processes,	which	in	turn	inﬂuences	the 
future	behavior	of	users.	Feedback	loops	form	as	targeting	shapes	online	experiences	and 
behaviours. 
Harm:		An	adverse	effect,	which	causes	damage,	injury	or	disadvantage	to	an	individual	or	group. 
Machine	Learning	(ML):	The	science	of	getting	computers	to	learn	and	act	like	humans	do,	and 
improve	their	learning	over	time	in	autonomous	fashion,	by	feeding	them	data	and	information	in 
the	form	of	observations	and	real-world	interactions.	Instead	of	requiring	explicit	programming 
of	this	model,	ML	algorithms	identify	patterns	in	data	to	develop	a	model	that	can	be	used	to 
reproduce	or	predict	the	behaviour	of	the	system	they	are	trying	to	learn	about.	When	provided 
with	suﬃcient	data,	a	machine	learning	algorithm	can	learn	to	make	predictions	or	solve 
problems,	such	as	identifying	objects	in	pictures	or	winning		at	particular	games. 
Microtargeting:	A	method	of	targeting	which	seeks	to	extract	far	more	granular	segmentations 
from	the	audience,	breaking	people	in	to	ever	smaller	and	tightly	deﬁned	groups.	This 
predominantly	uses	social	media	to	target	smaller	segments	or	groups	of	users,	and	can	even 
be	used	to	target	speciﬁc	individuals.  
Model	(machine	learning):	A	mathematical	representation	of	a	real-world	process. 	This	may 216
be	a	‘hypothesis’	regarding	a	phenomenon	described	by	data,	that	ideally	provides	a	concise 
explanation	of	complex	observations	by	identifying	generalisable	patterns	and	ignoring 
irrelevant	variations. 
Natural	Language	Processing	(NLP):	A	form	of	AI	aimed	at	enabling	computers	to	process	and 
understand	human	languages	and	interactions.  217
Online	Targeting:	Customisation	of	products	and	services	online	(including	content,	service 
standards	and	prices)	based	on	data	about	individuals	and	groups,	and	the	predicted	likelihood 
of	optimising	a	determined	outcome	through	this	customisation.	Instances	of	online	targeting 
range	from	online	advertising	and	personalised	social	media	feeds,	through	to	tailored 
recommendations. 
(Digital)	Platform:		A	business	which	facilitates	the	interaction	of	suppliers	and	consumers,	or 
the	sharing	of	content,	online.	Prominent	examples	include	Instagram,	Facebook,	Amazon	and 
Google. 
216	Bhattacharjee,	J.	(2017).	Some	key	machine	learning	definitions.		NineLeaps	,	available	at:	
https://medium.com/technology-nineleaps/some-key-machine-learning-definitions-b524eb6cb48	[accessed	
on:	11/07/19].	
217	Described	in	Seif,	G.	(20198).	‘An	easy	introduction	to	Natural	Language	Processing’.		BuiltIn	,	available	at:	
https://builtin.com/data-science/easy-introduction-natural-language-processing	[accessed	on:	10/07/19];	
Towards	Data	Science.	(2018),	available	at:	
https://towardsdatascience.com/an-easy-introduction-to-natural-language-processing-b1e2801291c1	
[accessed	on:	11/07/19].	
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Psychographic	targeting:		Where	an	individual's	interests	and	psychological	traits	(e.g.	the	‘Big	5’ 
personality	model) 	are	used	in	targeting.	It	can	be	used	to	create	inferences	around	a	person’s 218
attitudes,	and	categorise	people	based	on	interests	and	lifestyle. 
Recommendation	Engine/System:		Algorithmic	systems	that	use	data	produced	by	users	to 
recommend	content,	consumables	and	services.	These	systems	are	generally	considered 
predictive,	as	they	seek	to	predict	and	recommend	items	that	match	previous	consumption, 
interests	and	tastes,	etc.	They	may	also	consider	proﬁt	levels	(e.g.	recommending	a	speciﬁc 
product	for	purchase),	or	whether	your	contacts	have	liked	similar	content	(e.g.	Facebook 
recommending	content	based	on	the	activity	of	your	friends). 
Regression	analysis:		A	set	of	statistical	processes	used	for	estimating	the	relationships 
between	a	set	of	variables. 
Social	Network	Analysis	(SNA):		A	set	of	techniques	for	analysing	patterns	of	connections 
between	individuals	in	a	network.	This	can	reveal	basic	patterns	(such	as	which	people 
communicate	most	frequently	with	one	another)	but	also	more	sophisticated	patterns,	such	as 
the	individuals	which	link	disparate	and	otherwise	unconnected	groups	together,	and	those	who 
have	the	deepest	forms	of	connection	across	the	widest	variety	of	other	users. 
Sentiment	Analysis:		A	collection	of	techniques	designed	to	determine	a	person’s	attitude 
towards	something	based	on	the	words	they	use	to	describe	it.	This	often	seeks	to	discern	if 
that	language	reﬂects	a	more	positive,	negative	or	neutral	attitude	toward	the	object	being 
described. 
Surveillance	capitalism:		According	to	Zuboff	this	is	a	form	of	capitalism	with	interests	in 
‘behavioural	modiﬁcation’.	It	is,	as	Zuboff	deﬁnes	it,	‘a	new	economic	order	that	claims	human 
experience	as	a	free	raw	material	for	translation	into	behavioural	data’,	in	order	to	facilitate 
‘hidden	commercial	practices’,	‘prediction’	and	‘sales’.  219
Viral	content/media:	Metaphors	of	contagion	are	often	used	to	understand	how	information	and 
content	achieves	wide	recognition	in	internet	and	social	media	spaces.	When	content	spreads 
quickly	and	reaches	a	wide	audience	it	is	often	referred	to	as	going	‘viral’.	Social	media	is	often 
associated	with	viral	media,	as	they	allow	content	to	spread	rapidly	through	their	networks. 
Vulnerability:		A	state	of	being	predisposed	to	the	potential	for	harm	and	adverse	effects.	In 
terms	of	online	targeting	this	could	include	groups	such	as:	children,	people	with	addictions, 
people	with	poor	mental	health,	people	experiencing	more	temporary	vulnerabilities	such	as	the 
recently	bereaved,	etc. 
 
218	Azucar,	D.,	Marengo,	D.,	&	Se anni,	M.	(2018).	Predic ng	the	Big	5	personality	traits	from	digital	footprints	on	social	
media:	A	meta-analysis.	Personality	and	individual	diﬀerences,	124,	150-159.	
219		Zuboﬀ,	S.	(2019).		The	age	of	surveillance	capitalism:	The	ﬁght	for	a	human	future	at	the	new	fron er	of	power	.	
Proﬁle	Books	.		
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